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INTRODUCTION 
As sirens wail and smoke appears on the horizon, one passenger 
remarks to the dri ver on the in juries the accident caused. Elsewhere a 
woman drops and shatters a water glass and the friend whose home 
she is visiting cuts herself on the shards ; when she apologizes for the 
injury, her friend accepts . After all, anyone could see it was an 
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accident. Both ca se s  capture the apparent simplicity of identifying 
accident s and injurie s. In many ca se s  people intuitively and in stantly 
know they have occurred. Yet it i s  much more difficult to explain why 
a child announce s that she ha s had an "accident " when she ha s soiled 
her self or whether the addictive, life-threatening plea sure that 
accompanie s cocaine u se con stitute s an "injury." Doe s a soldier who 
unintentionally trigger s a landmine purpo sefully set by enemy troop s 
or a drunk driver who wrap s hi s car around a tree die accidentally? 
What di stingui she s the injury a strangler cau se s  from the experience of 
holding one' s breath under water? 
Court s, it turn s out , have had many conflicting an swer s to the se 
que stion s. The i ssue ari se s  becau se mo st accident-in surance policie s 
guarantee recovery for injurie s and death s occa sioned by "external, 
violent and accidental mean s" but exclude intentionally self-inflicted 
injury.1 In adjudicating such ca se s, court s mu st apply intuition s about 
the occurrence of accident s and injurie s to a dizzying array of exotic 
fact pattern s. 2 The in surance policie s provide little guidance beyond 
the spar se language above. 3 And becau se court s have found it difficult 
to articulate the intuition s behind identification s of accident s and 
injurie s, they have come to incon si stent re sult s.4 
Ca se s  involving autoerotic-a sphyxiation death s illu strate the 
difficulty. Autoerotic a sphyxiation i s  the practice of temporarily 
depriving one self of oxygen while ma sturbating in order to increa se 
sexual sen sation, and death can re sult when the flow of oxygen i s  not 
re stored in a timely manner. 5 Practitioner s die either becau se they pa ss 
1. Adam F. Scales, Man, God and the Serbonian Bog: The Evolution of Accidental 
Death Insurance, 86 IOWA L. REV. 173, 234 (2000) (quoting MARTIN P. CORNELIUS, 
ACCIDENTAL MEANS 4-5 (1916) ("external, violent and accidental means")); id. at 294 
("intentionally self-inflicted injury"}; see also Oldring v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 492 F. Supp. 
994, 997 (D.N.J. 1980) (discussing prior cases of "courts interpreting accidental means 
provisions"); Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2002} (involving an 
intentionally self-inflicted injury clause). 
2. The Supreme Court most recently struggled with this question during oral arguments 
in Olympic Airways v. Husain, while considering an accidental death claim in which an 
airline passenger died after prolonged exposure to tobacco smoke. Oral Argument, Olympic 
Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004} (No. 02-1348), available at http://www. 
supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/02-1348.pdf (last visited June 6, 
2005). 
3. Scales, supra note 1, at 234, 294. 
4. See, e.g., Wickman v. Northwestern Nat'! Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1087 (1st Cir. 1990) 
("Much of the inconsistency in the case law defining and applying the definition of accident 
is traceable to the difficulty in giving substance to a concept which is largely intuitive."); 
Gordon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 260 A.2d 338, 340 (Md. 1970} ("[T]he entire field of accident 
law" is a bog and "[t]he main component of the bog is a wide variety of facts in a context 
even broader than the fact-smothered field of negligence law."); Scales, supra note 1, at 294 
(discussing the different outcomes courts have reached when applying intentionally self­
inflicted-injury exclusions). 
5. See, e.g., Parker v. Danaher Corp., 851 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 (W.D. Ark. 1994) 
(describing autoerotic asphyxiation as "an attempt to increase sexual gratification from 
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out before re storing the flow of oxygen or becau se a mechanical safety 
apparatu s fail s. 6  Court s have not characterized such death s a s  suicide s 
but have struggled with whether to deem them "accident s" that are 
covered by in surance policie s. 
To date, hard number s on the death rate of autoerotic 
a sphyxiation have been difficult to produce. The number of death s per 
year re sulting from autoerotic a sphyxiation ha s been variou sly 
calculated to lie between forty and two-thou sand. 7 But becau se of 
underreporting , the number of annual incident s or practitioner s i s  
largely unknown. 8 Thu s the only firm statement one can make about 
autoerotic a sphyxiation i s  that throughout the general population 
"death by autoerotic a sphyxiation i s  stati stically rare. "9 Nonethele ss, 
expert s and court s have tended to concur that mo st incident s of 
autoerotic a sphyxiation end in survival and do not produce seriou s or 
permanent injury.10 A s  a re sult of thi s information and it s ob scure and 
masturbation . . . by . . . restricting the supply of oxygen to the brain in an attempt to 
intensify the sensations of masturbation"); Critchlow v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co., 198 F. 
Supp. 2d 318, 325-26 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) [hereinafter Critchlow I] ("It is common knowledge 
that strangulation will result in death if it continues long enough . . . .  "), aff'd, 340 F.3d 130 
(2d Cir. 2003), vacated and rev'd, 378 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004). 
6. Bennett v. Am. Int') Life Assurance Co., 956 F. Supp. 201, 204 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS § 302.83 (4th ed. 1994)) (describing how due to 
"equipment malfunction, errors in the placement of the noose or ligature, or other mistakes, 
accidental deaths sometimes occur"); Cronin v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 29, 38 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("This loss of awareness and control in the search for an ever more intense 
high risks death, and limits the conscious ability to reverse death's grasp."). 
7. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex. App. 1981) 
(summarizing expert testimony to the effect that "forty deaths per year were reported in the 
United States as a result of such activity"); Lonergan v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 
CV-96-11832-PBS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24075, at *3 (D. Mass. May 29, 1997) (quoting 
Kessler Aff. at 6-7) ("approximately 2,000 deaths occur per year in this country arising out of 
autoerotic stimulation"). Courts have also acknowledged the difficulties in finding reliable 
numbers. See, e.g., Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., No. 3:93CV0054-R, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21539, at *20 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 1994) [hereinafter Todd I] (quoting Katherine 
Seigenthaler, No Intention of Killing Themselves, WASH. POST, June 12, 1985, Health 
Section at 7) ("The Washington Post reported that the actual number of annual deaths 'is 
difficult to gauge because experts believe many are mistaken for suicides or murders."'), 
modified, 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir. 1995). 
8. The numbers are so scarce that few sources even comment on the question. But 
see Peter M.E. Cummings et al., Auto-erotic Asphyxia, at http://www.geocities.com/ 
pathologypete/autocasel.html (last visited June 6, 2005) ("The exact number of individuals 
practicing autoerotic asphyxiation in the general population is unknown . . . .  "). 
9. Critchlow v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2003) [hereinafter 
Critchlow II] (Kearse, J., dissenting) (summarizing expert opinions), vacated and rev'd, 378 
F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004). Note that this provides little insight into the cumulative risks that 
ongoing practitioners of autoerotic asphyxiation face. 
10. See Critchlow II, supra note 9, 340 F.3d at 137 (Kearse, J., dissenting) (quoting a 
February 18, 2002 report by Stephen J. Hucker, Medical Director, Professor of Psychiatry, 
and Head of the Division of Forensic Psychiatry in the Forensic Program of McMaster 
University) ("[A)utoerotic asphyxia) episodes do not, inevitably, or even substantially likely, 
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inconclu sive nature, one cannot say that practitioner s of autoerotic 
a sphyxiation ought to ex pect to die.11 Nonethele ss, court s have 
reached di sparate deci sion s on the practice' s accidentalne ss and 
injuriou sne ss.12 
Mo st court s have a ssigned "accident " a lay definition when 
inter preting accident-in surance policie s.13 The difficulty ha s ari sen in 
lead to a fatal outcome."); Cronin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 38 ("If the practitioner retains his 
senses, and the experts maintain that most do, the pressure on the carotid arteries can be 
relieved in time to prevent permanent damage to the tissues of the neck or brain, and the 
body can recuperate."); Tommie, 619 S.W.2d at 202 (summarizing expert testimony to the 
effect that "death is not the normal expected result"); ROBERT R. ET AL., AUTOEROTIC 
FATALITIES 49 (1983) (stating that autoerotic asphyxiation ends "more often than not with a 
nonfatal outcome"). For more examples, see infra note 11. 
11. Courts that grant recovery take this approach. E.g., Tommie, 619 S.W.2d at 202 
(granting recovery after explaining that "death is not the normal expected result of that 
behavior" (summarizing expert testimony)). Cf Todd I, supra note 7, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21539, at *23 (arguing that because most people do not perceive the risks of sexual asphyxia, 
fatal results are not reasonably foreseeable). They often explain that it is more likely than 
not that practitioners will survive autoerotic asphyxiation or at least assert that death is not 
quite "substantially certain" and hold that such levels of foreseeability are insufficient to 
preclude classification as accidents. Id. at *33 ("This Court finds as a matter of law that 
death is not a substantially certain result to be expected from participating in autoerotic 
acts."); Tommie, 619 S.W.2d at 202-03 ("[A]lthough the type of activity in which Mr. 
Tommie was engaged was foolish and fraught with substantial risk of injury or death, it was 
not of such a nature that the insured should have reasonably known that it would probably 
result in his death."); Kennedy v. Wash. Nat'! Ins. Co., 401 N.W. 2d 842, 846 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1987) ("It was a foolish act involving some risk of injury or death, but it was not of such a 
nature that Kennedy knew or should have known that it probably would result in death" and 
"[d]eath was not a normal expected result."); id. ("Although Kennedy's act can be 
considered bizarre or unusual, we agree . . .  that there is no evidence that Kennedy's death 
was highly probable, expected, or a natural result."). Pro-recovery courts sometimes concede 
that autoerotic asphyxiation is relatively risky, but still argue that it is not so risky as to be 
nonaccidental. See Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1456 (5th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter 
Todd II] ("[T]he materials before the court clearly indicated that the likelihood of death 
from autoerotic activity falls far short of what would be required to negate coverage . . . .  "); 
MAMSI Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Callaway, 825 A.2d 995, 1001 (Md. 2003) [hereinafter 
MAMSI Ill] (summarizing MAMSI Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Callaway, 806 A.2d 274 (Md. 
Ct. App. 2002) [hereinafter MAMSI II], vacated, MAMSI Ill, supra) (explaining that the 
lower court "analogized autoerotic asphyxiation with other activities that are inherently 
dangerous, although apparently more socially acceptable in the mainstream of extreme 
human recreational activities - skydiving, bungee jumping, white water rafting, parasailing, 
mountain climbing, and scuba diving - to support its finding that the injuries" resulted from 
an accident). 
12. Compare, e.g. , Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding 
autoerotic-asphyxiation deaths accidental), with Sigler v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 663 F.2d 
49 (8th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Sigler II] (opposite); compare Fawcett v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
No. C-3-97-540, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10061 (S.D. Ohio June 28, 2000) (finding autoerotic 
asphyxiation injurious), with Padfield, 290 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2002) (opposite). 
13. Courts generally reason that the word "accident" is only susceptible to its lay 
meaning. Cf, e.g. , Olson v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 901-02 (Ct. App. 
1994) (quoting Pilcher v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 102 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85 (Ct. App. 1972)) ("'[T]he 
words "accident" and "accidental" have never acquired any technical meaning in the law 
and must be construed according to ordinary understanding and common usage."'). 
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application. 14 As one justice of the California Supreme Court noted, 
most laypeople can agree on a heartland of cases that do and do not 
constitute accidents but cannot formulate the principles underlying 
their categorizations.15 The problem is that while accidents clearly 
involve an unintended and unforeseen result, they do not include all 
such results. 16 Substantially all laypeople would likely agree, for 
instance, that an accident "is not . . .  a death from disease, nor a death 
from the natural causes of old age. "17 But when courts have tried to 
articulate how laypeople make these intuitive distinctions, they have 
generally failed.18 As one rather resignedly explained, "Probably the 
best definition is Cardozo's tautology that an accident is what the 
public calls an accident, which aids jurists in deciding individual cases 
only slightly. "19 And because of this difficulty, they have come to 
inconsistent results in assessing the accidentalness of autoerotic­
asphyxiation deaths.20 
Most accident-insurance policies also include a clause that forbids 
recovery where the harm results from an intentionally self-inflicted 
injury. 21 To trigger the clause, the insured must intentionally injure 
herself in a way that results in a further, unintentional injury. For 
instance, a person who slit her wrists as a cry for help but then bled to 
death on the way to the hospital would not recover for either the 
14. One could contest the existence of common, Jay definitions of words, and thus argue 
that this difficulty arises because words are always slippery and ambiguous. Whatever the 
merits of that position in general, this Note argues that in this context Jay definitions produce 
determinate outcomes. 
15. Weil v. Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 866 P.2d 774, 803 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., 
dissenting) (reasoning that most people would define accidents through examples); see also 
Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n of Am., 67 N.E.2d 248, 251 (N.Y. 1946) 
(noting that most people would stumble "if asked to formulate a written definition of the 
word"). 
16. Burr, 67 N.E.2d at 251 (reasoning that a layperson "would say that the term applied 
only to an unusual and extraordinary happening; that it must be the result of chance; that the 
cause must be unanticipated or, if known, the result must be unexpected"). 
17. Weil, 866 P.2d at 803 (Mosk, J., dissenting). In Weil, dissenting Justice Mosk 
contrasted this observation with the claim that a layperson forced to define an accident 
"would probably be reduced to describing the deaths in such broad and general terms as 
happening by chance, unusual, unforeseen, unanticipated, unexpected, and unintended." Id. 
18. Scales, supra note 1, at 236-37 (noting that while "courts could turn to this reservoir 
of common understanding where the strict technical definition was unavailing or inapposite" 
they "often entertained implausible, if not bizarre, notions regarding the average person's 
understanding of the term 'accident"'); see also Wickman v. Northwestern Nat'! Ins. Co., 908 
F.2d 1077, 1087 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Much of the inconsistency in the case Jaw defining and 
applying the definition of accident is traceable to the difficulty in giving substance to a 
concept which is largely intuitive."). 
19. Wickman, 908 F.2d at 1086 (summarizing Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
291 U.S. 491 (1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting)). 
20. See supra note 12. 
21. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
• \ugust 2005] Word Games 2177 
intended loss of blood (nonaccidental) or the accidental fatality that 
followed (result of intentionally self-inflicted injury). Courts have 
divided over whether such clauses preclude recovery in cases of 
autoerotic-as phyxiation deaths. Some have concluded that decedents 
intentionally injure themselves when they tem porarily cut the su p ply 
of oxygen to their brains.22 Others have disagreed, holding that 
tem porary and voluntary de privation of oxygen does not constitute an 
injury within a lay definition.23 A third grou p has found the question 
sufficiently close to allow insurers to settle it under clauses granting 
them the right to inter pret policy terms.24 As with accidents, the 
controversy arises from difficulties in defining a common and 
seemingly uncom plicated word. 
This Note argues that autoerotic-as phyxiation deaths are accidents 
and not the results of intentionally self-inflicted injuries. Part I 
formally analyzes accident-insurance case law to show that current, 
viable a p proaches to accident insurance indicate that autoerotic­
as phyxiation deaths are accidental. Part I I  claims autoerotic­
as phyxiation deaths should not trigger intentionally self-inflicted­
injury exclusion clauses because the practice does not intentionally 
injure. This Note concludes beneficiaries should recover when 
accident-insurance policyholders die during autoerotic as phyxiation. 
I. AUTOEROTIC-ASPHYXIATION DEATHS ARE ACCIDENTAL 
This Part advances a new test for determining whether death from 
autoerotic as phyxiation is accidental and contends that this new test is 
su perior to alternative a p proaches.25 The first ste p under this test is 
22. See infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra note 125 and accompanying text; Cozzie v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 
1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 1998) ("When language granting . . . broad power to interpret the 
document is vested in the fiduciary, we have held that the appropriate standard of review 
ought to be the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard." (summarizing Cutting v. Jerome Foods, 
Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
25. Courts do not currently explicitly follow the approach I delineate. Instead, they 
undertake analyses that do not explain the results they reach, especially in autoerotic­
asphyxiation cases. Today, a majority of courts purport to equate accidental harms with 
unforeseeable ones. See infra note 92. These courts come out both ways in autoerotic­
asphyxiation cases. Compare Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2002), 
Parker v. Danaher Corp., 851 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Ark. 1994), Todd I, supra note 7, 1994 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21539 (N.D. Tex. 1994), modified, 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir. 1995), Conn. Gen. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. App. 1981), and Kennedy v. Wash. Nat'l Ins. 
Co., 401 N.W.2d 842 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (all granting recovery), with Sigler II, supra note 
12, 663 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1981), Int'l Underwriters, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 662 F.2d 1084 (4th 
Cir. 1981), Cronin v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 29 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), and Lonergan 
v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. CA 96-11832-PBS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24075 (D. 
Mass. May 29, 1997) (denying recovery), with Bennett v. Am. Int'l Life Assurance Co., 956 
F. Supp. 201 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying insurer motion for summary judgment and sending 
case to trial). In two instances, courts denied recovery because the absence of a mechanical 
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resolving whether death is the expected result of the practice. If not, 
courts should then grant recovery unless they determine autoerotic 
asphyxiation constitutes either a crime or a "high-risk act of bravura." 
A high-risk act of bravura is (1) an extremely dangerous activity; (2) 
that practitioners engage in for the purpose of exposing themselves to 
risk; and (3) that serves no valuable end.26 
In defending the above test, this Part argues that it better reflects 
the actual practices of courts than do the workable alternatives that 
courts purport to apply. Section I. A argues that in most cases, courts 
have found unexpected results - like deaths during instances of 
autoerotic asphyxiation -to be accidents. It then observes that courts 
have hindered recovery in cases involving certain types of stigmatized 
activity, but explains that the stigma that attaches to autoerotic 
asphyxiation is of a different type. Section l.B contends that although 
some courts have advanced an alternate approach known as 
"accidental-means analysis," the analysis depends upon a distinction 
without a difference and thus provides no grounds upon which to 
reach a contrary result. This Part concludes that autoerotic­
asphyxiation deaths are accidents. 
A. Formal Analysis Reveals the Accidentalness of Autoerotic­
Asphyxiation Deaths 
This Section proposes a test that reflects the current practices of 
courts. Section 1 explains that courts generally grant recovery in cases 
involving unexpected results. This encompasses the deaths that arise 
from autoerotic asphyxiation. Section 2 observes that courts have 
hindered recovery in cases involving crimes or high-risk acts of 
bravura. Because most courts have not explicitly acknowledged the 
role that these, but not other, stigmatized activities have factored into 
their considerations, their analyses of the issue have not been formal. 
safety apparatus sufficiently increased the risk of death from autoerotic asphyxiation so as to 
make survival expectations unreasonable. Sigler II, supra note 1 2 ,  663 F.2d at 50; Lonergan, 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24075, at *17. One court that granted recovery reasoned that the fact 
that the decedent had survived autoerotic asphyxiation on many occasions weighed "in the 
determination of whether death was substantially likely to result." Bennett, 956 F. Supp. at 
212. Another court noted both the decedent's twenty years of experience practicing 
autoerotic asphyxiation and the mechanical safety apparatus he had unsuccessfully 
employed in granting recovery. Critchlow v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co., 378 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 
2004) [hereinafter Critchlow III]. For a discussion of autoerotic-asphyxiation cases in other 
jurisdictions, see infra notes 118-119 and accompanying text. 
26. While bravura indicates both exposure to risk for its own sake and social display, 
this Note uses it more broadly to encompass solitary behaviors as well. 2 THE OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 498 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989) (defining 
bravura as a "[d]isplay of daring"). To the extent that solitarily subjecting oneself to a high­
risk activity constitutes attempting suicide, the distinction becomes one without a difference 
for the purposes of this Note. 
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This has created problems in autoerotic-asphyxiation cases, where 
courts have observed the stigma that attaches to the activity and then 
implicitly and unconvincingly analogized it to a crime or high-risk act 
of bravura. This Section illuminates why only crimes and high-risk acts 
of bravura, and not other sources of stigma, should and do impede 
recovery. Conse quently, courts ought to grant recovery in autoerotic­
asphyxiation cases. 
1. Foreseeability 
In many cases, laypeople's determinations of accidentalness hinge 
on the likelihood that the injury-causing activity would cause a harm 
similar to the one that occurred.27 This Note maintains that as a 
general matter, harms are only so likely to occur as to be 
nonaccidental if they are the expected result of an activity. This 
standard is consistent with courts' historical and modern tendencies. 
While different modern courts set the level of foreseeability necessary 
to preclude recovery at various levels,28 recent courts have returned to 
definitions of accident that exclude harms on foreseeability grounds 
only when they represent the expected outcome of the injury-causing 
event. Federal courts have led and exemplified the change.29 Under 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( "ER I S A"), 
27. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
28. While most modem courts have purported to use foreseeability tests, they have 
often disagreed over the level of foreseeability that precludes recovery. Compare Todd ll, 
supra note 11, 47 F.3d 1448, 1456 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a subjective expectation of 
survival indicates accidentalness unless the risk of death "reach[es) the level of 'substantial 
certainty"'), with Sigler ll, supra note 12, 663 F.2d at 49 (quoting Sigler v. Mut. Benefit Life 
Ins. Co., 506 F. Supp. 542, 544 (S.D. Iowa 1981) [hereinafter Sigler/], aff d, 663 F.2d 49 (8th 
Cir. 1981)) (summarizing Iowa law to the effect that no accident occurs where "a reasonable 
person would have recognized that his actions could result in his death"). They have also 
differed over whether to measure perceptions of risk subjectively or objectively. Compare 
Santaella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting JOHN ALAN 
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, WITH FORMS § 360, at 452-53 (1981) ("[I)t is 
customary to look at the casualty from the point of view of the insured."), with Gaskins v. 
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 104 So. 2d 171, 177 (La. 1958) (quoting Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v. 
Clark, 144 F.2d 165, 167 (10th Cir. 1944)) (characterizing the test as "whether the average 
man, under the existing facts and circumstances, would regard the loss so unforeseen, 
unexpected, and extraordinary that he would say it was an accident."), with MAMSI Ill, 
supra note 11, 825 A.2d 995, 1000 (Md. 2003) ("The test has subjective and objective 
components."). Nonetheless, many courts have agreed that once these criteria are set, the 
test should be dispositive. See, e.g., Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 501 
n.2 (1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (quoting W. Commercial Travelers' Ass'n v. Smith, 85 F. 
401, 405 (8th Cir. 1898)) (finding no accident where result "is the natural and probable 
consequence of an act or course of action"); Weil v. Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 866 
P.2d 774, 809 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Collins v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 
294 N.W.2d 194, 196 (Mich. 1980)) ("[C)onduct would in all probability result in his death." 
(footnote omitted and emphasis added in Weil)). 
29. See, e.g. , MAMSI Ill, supra note 11, 825 A.2d at 1001 (discussing federal ERISA 
jurisprudence in the context of a state-court accident-insurance claim). 
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federal common law reaches large numbers of accident-insurance 
cases, preem pting much state law and increasing the influence of the 
federal courts. 30 In exercising its influence over accident-insurance law, 
much of the federal judiciary a p plies an accidentalness test that the 
First Circuit initiated in Wickman v. Northwestern National Insurance 
Co.31: injuries are nonaccidental only if they were all but certain to 
occur.32 
Early courts attem pting to decide whether harms constituted 
accidents agreed. They also distinguished situations in which 
decedents intentionally killed themselves or engaged in an activity 
whose ex pected outcome was death from those in which decedents 
intentionally undertook a risky activity which they antici pated 
surviving.33 
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000). ERISA's scope is quite broad, encompassing nearly 
"any employee benefit plan . . . established or maintained- (1) by any employer engaged in 
commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or (2) by any employee 
organization or organizations representing employees engaged in commerce or in any 
industry or activity affecting commerce; or (3) by both." Id. § 1003(a). "ERISA trumps 
everything - almost any state law cause of action you can think of will be preempted by 
ERISA." Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Employee Benefits for General Practitioners: Ten Rules 
that Every Attorney Should Know About ER/SA, 26 TEX. TECH UNIV. L. REV. 579, 580 
(1995). 
31. 908 F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1990). 
32. See, e.g., Todd II, supra note 11, 47 F.3d at 1456 (explaining that no accident occurs 
if "the risk of death involved in the conduct at issue" reaches "the level of 'substantial 
certainty"'); cf MAM SI III, supra note 11, 825 A.2d at 1000-01. 
33. In 1886, twenty-three years after accident insurance first appeared in the United 
States, an Illinois Circuit Court surveyed definitions of accidents proposed by prior courts in 
Crandal v. Accident Insurance Co., 27 F. 40 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1886), affd, 120 U.S. 527 (1887). 
See also Accident Insurance, 7 AM. L. REV. 585 (1873) (writing in 1873 that "the first 
American [accident-insurance] company is only ten years old"). It found that courts deciding 
cases on foreseeability grounds held unusual, unexpected, unintended, and chance events 
accidental. The Crandal court found that prior courts had held that an "accident [is] . . . '[a]n 
event which, under the circumstances, is unusual and unexpected by the person to whom it 
happens; the happening of an event without the concurrence of the will of the person by whose 
agency it was caused,"' 27 F. at 42 (incorrectly quoting JOHN BOUVIER, 1 A LAW 
DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 37 (1st ed. 1839)), 
"any event which takes place without the oversight or expectation of the person acted upon 
or affected by the event," id. (quoting Accident Insurance, supra, at 587-88 (quoting Ripley 
v. Ry. Passengers' Assurance Co., 20 F. Cas. 823, 825 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1870) (No. 11854))), 
and "any unexpected event which happens as by chance, or which does not take place 
according to the usual course of things," id. (quoting Accident Insurance, supra, at 588 
(quoting North Am. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 69 Pa. 43, 51 (1871))). Modern 
courts have observed that the common law went even further, requiring specific intent to 
hold a death nonaccidental on foreseeability grounds. As the Parker v. Danaher Corp. court 
wrote, "[t]he common law . . .  prescrib[es] that these terms should be judged from the 
viewpoint of the insured," 851 F. Supp. 1287, 1294 (W.D. Ark. 1994) (quoting Wickman v. 
Northwestern Nat'! Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1087 (1st Cir. 1990)) (first alteration in original), 
which "means that unless [a decedent] 'actually expected to die, essentially that he 
specifically intended to commit suicide, his death must be considered an accident,"' id. 
(quoting and summarizing the plaintiff's argument). 
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Although some modem courts have set lower likelihood-of-harm 
cutoffs for recovery,34 these approaches are best seen as the legacy of 
an anomalous line of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century 
cases in which courts manipulated levels of foreseeability so that they 
could use foreseeability tests to the exclusion of other approaches.35 
The better approach is to consider all relevant considerations 
explicitly and, as is the early and modem trend, to only preclude 
recovery where injury was an activity's expected result. 
Available evidence suggests that laypeople agree with the early 
and modern trend. As Justice Mosk of �he California Supreme Court 
has observed, "if asked to specify what ... accidental deaths have in 
34. The likelihoods of injury necessary to defeat recovery in jurisdictions that consider 
only foreseeability of harm have ranged from not "probabl[e],"  Kennedy v. Wash. Nat'! Ins. 
Co., 401 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), to anything less than "substantial certainty," 
Todd II, supra note 11, 47 F.3d at 1456. See also MAMSI III, supra note 11, 825 A.2d at 1000 
(quoting Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 753 A.2d 533, 540 (Md. 2000)) ("unusual"); Conn. 
Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex. App. 1981) (quoting Freeman v. 
Crown Life Ins. Co., 580 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)) ("mere . . .  gross 
negligence"). 
Courts have also used bases other than likelihood of harm to determine foreseeability. 
See Santaella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Casey v. 
Uddeholm Corp., 32 F.3d 1094, 1097 (7th Cir. 1994)) ("unintentional"); Sigler I, supra note 
28, 506 F. Supp. 542, 544 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (quoting Rowe v. United Commercial Travelers' 
Ass'n, 172 N.W.2d 454, 458 (Iowa 1919)) (not "apparent"). And levels have varied within 
individual opinions. See, e.g., Kennedy, 401 N.W.2d at 846 (describing the test as not "highly 
probable " or "inevitable," not "natural and probable," more than "negligent," and not 
"probabl[ e ]"). 
35. This trend likely started with a federal circuit-court case involving a robbery/murder 
victim, Ripley v. Railway Passengers' Assurance Co. , 20 F. Cas. 823 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1870) 
(No. 11,854). See Scales, supra note 1, at 238 (describing Ripley as a case in which "the 
insured was robbed and murdered while traveling"). Ripley presented the interesting issue of 
whether decedents who do not foresee their attack have died accidentally despite the 
purposeful nature of their assailants' assaults. After all, killers cannot claim that their attacks 
are accidental because their victims did not foresee the attacks but soldiers can speak of the 
accidental death of a comrade who unwittingly triggered an enemy landmine. In holding for 
the plaintiff, the court did not explicitly address the question, but instead folded it into an 
exclusive foreseeability test that defined accidents as "that which occurs to [decedents] 
unexpectedly." Ripley, 20 F. Cas. at 825. 
Subsequently, the likelihood of harm necessary to preclude recovery fell. Courts that 
followed Ripley shared its reliance on the insured's subjective perspective. Because 
nineteenth-century jurisprudence held people "to intend the natural and probable 
consequence[s] of [their] deeds," this encouraged these courts to find no accident in cases 
where insureds suffered unlikely but negligent harms. Scales, supra note 1, at 242 (quoting 
W. Commercial Travelers' Ass'n v. Smith, 85 F. 401, 405 (8th Cir. 1898)). Scales elaborates 
that, "[t]he idea that an event might be nonaccidental because the insured had been 
negligent was spurred by courts' reliance on the insured's subjective perspective,"  id. at 245, 
and that "[e]ven if the insured was not at fault, circumstances preceding death might 
sufficiently alert him to the likelihood of injury so that it would no longer be entirely 
'unforeseen' or 'unexpected."' Id. at 242. 
Other early cases followed Ripley. See, e.g. , Supreme Council of the Order of Chosen 
Friends v. Garrigus, 3 N.E. 818 (Ind. 1885) (pistol shot wound); Guldenkirch v. United 
States Mut. Accident Ass'n, 5 N.Y.S. 428 (N.Y. City Ct. 1889) (same); Richards v. Travelers' 
Ins. Co., 26 P. 762 (Cal. 1891) (struck by third party); Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Johnson, 17 So. 2 
(Miss. 1895) (death at the hands of a mob). 
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common, the layperson . . . would probably . . . describ[ e] the 
deaths . . . as happening by chance, unusual, unforeseen, 
unanticipated, unexpected, and unintended."36 Dictionaries concur 
that accidents indicate harmful events whose outcomes victims neither 
intend nor expect.37 Similarly, while it would be strange to see the 
deaths of individuals who point loaded guns at their heads while 
"entertaining a fanciful expectation that fate would ... favor them" as 
accidents, it is normal and natural to deem mountain-climber or deep­
sea-diver deaths accidental.38 In fact, insureds likely purchase accident 
insurance to mitigate the risk of subsequent unexpected -and thus 
unavoided - contingencies and, as laypeople, thereby reveal their 
belief that accidents are unforeseen.39 A lay definition finds harms 
nonaccidental on foreseeability grounds only if they are the expected 
result of the injury-causing activity. 
As the Introduction explains, death is not the expected result of 
autoerotic asphyxiation.40 Absent some other consideration courts 
should hold such deaths accidental. 
2. Stigma and Morality 
Although many courts in foreseeability-test jurisdictions have 
claimed that foreseeability operates to the exclusion of other 
considerations, other courts have observed that morality has affected 
outcomes throughout accident-insurance law. Justice Mosk of the 
California Supreme Court has noted that moral considerations have 
sometimes determined close cases.41 New Jersey's high court has 
observed that idiosyncratic moral intuitions of individual courts in 
36. Weil v. Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 866 P.2d 774, 803 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., 
dissenting); cf Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n of Am., 67 N.E.2d 248, 
251 (N.Y. 1946) ("[T]he average man would . . .  say that the term [accident] applied only to 
an unusual and extraordinary happening; that it must be the result of chance; that the cause 
must be unanticipated or, if known, the result must be unexpected."). 
37. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 10-11 ( Eds. 
of The Am. Heritage Dictionaries eds., 4th ed. 2000) (defining accident as "[a]n unexpected 
and undesirable event, especially one resulting in damage or harm"); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 7 (Frederick C. Mish et al. eds., 10th ed. 1997) ("an 
unexpected . . .  event"); 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at 74 
("[a]nything that happens without foresight or expectation" or "[a]n unfortunate event"); 
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 12 (Wendalyn R. Nichols et al. 
eds., 2nd ed. 2001) ("an undesirable or unfortunate happening that occurs unintentionally" 
and "any event that happens unexpectedly"). 
38. Wickman, 908 F.2d at 1087 (describing russian-roulette practitioners). 
39. Weil, 866 P.2d at 808 (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("[I]nsureds purchase accident coverage 
in significant part to safeguard themselves or their beneficiaries against the consequences of 
their own thoughtless, negligent, or even foolhardy acts."). 
40. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text. 
41. Weil, 866 P.2d at 804-06 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
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individual cases may provide the best guide to how some cases will be 
decided. 42 As a result, cases involving similar risks have come out 
differently and applications of the tests courts purport to apply have 
varied, giving them little predictive power. 43 
Despite observing that the stigma that attaches to activities people 
consider immoral occasionally affects outcomes, courts have not taken 
a formal approach to delineating how or why. This analytic looseness 
has led some to analogize the stigma that attaches to autoerotic­
asphyxiation practitioners to the stigma that attaches in cases where 
courts have hindered recovery. A more formal analysis demonstrates 
that courts have hindered recovery only in cases involving crimes or 
high-risk acts of bravura.44 Autoerotic asphyxiation falls into neither 
category. 
Drug-overdose cases illustrate how courts have made recovery 
more difficult in cases involving illegal activities. Santaella v. 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. featured a decedent who died from an 
overdose of a prescription drug whose therapeutic dose and fatal dose 
were sufficiently similar that fatal results were common. 45 The Seventh 
Circuit allowed recovery, finding the evidence insufficient for a jury to 
find "death either 'highly likely to occur' . . .  or 'substantially certain 
to result. "'46 One court even granted recovery after a decedent mixed 
prescription drugs and alcohol into a lethal combination.47 Compare 
Weil v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co. , where the California 
42. Linden Motor Freight Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 A.2d 217, 223 (N.J. 1963) (What 
"[t]he broad words 'accident' and 'accidental' . . .  encompass . . .  largely depends on the 
viewpoint of the person whose judgment is to govern."). 
43. Id. ("[T]he outcome of cases which one might think factually analogous, as well as 
the legal reasoning used to support the conclusion, varies not only from state to state but 
within a state."); Weil, 866 P.2d at 805 (Mosk , J., dissenting) (quoting Linden Motor Freight 
Co., 193 A.2d at 223) ('"Very much seems to depend upon a court's unexpressed feeling of 
the fair and reasonable result in the particular factual setting, with made-to-order criteria 
and language then being used to bring about legal conformance to the conclusion previously 
reached."'). 
44. Courts have not precluded recovery in every case where an insured's injury results 
from the insured's criminal act or high-risk act of bravura. See, e.g. , West v. Aetna Life Ins. 
Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d 856 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (granting recovery after the decedent crashed his 
car while under the influence of alcohol). Rather, courts have appeared to tip the balance 
against recovery when the insured's injury resulted from the insured's illegal act or high-risk 
act of bravura. See infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (explaining how the 
accidentalness of drug-overdose deaths can hinge on whether the drugs were illegal or by 
prescription). This Note does not delineate the mechanics of this tipping in cases involving 
crimes or high-risk acts of bravura. 
45. 123 F.3d 456 , 459 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting R.26 , Ex.2 (Zumwalt Dep.)) ("The 
Medical Examiner concluded . . .  'propoxyphene has been associated very commonly with 
accidental drug overdoses because there is a very small margin . . .  between a therapeutic 
dose and a toxic or lethal dose . . . .  "'). 
46. Id. at 463; see also Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 7 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 
1937) (veronal overdose). 
47. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Main, 383 F.2d 952, 960 (5th Cir. 1967). 
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Supreme Court faced a cocaine death in a year when users died 
0 .0014% of the time they used.48 Proceeding in part under a standard 
that hinged on foreseeability, the court held that "death reasonably 
could be anticipated. "49 Writing in dissent, Justice Mosk convincingly 
rebutted the majority's rationales. He reasoned the result could only 
be reconciled with the majority's fidelity to holding prescription-drug 
overdoses nonaccidental if the majority's repeated references to 
cocaine's illegality indicated that the majority had granted illegality a 
dispositive role. so Stigma alone was not enough: although any of the 
decedents in these cases could have been subject to stigma, only the 
one using illegal drugs was also subject to criminal sanction. 
Courts have drawn a similar distinction between high-risk acts of 
bravura and other dangerous activities that provide an experiential 
benefit beyond, although not necessary exclusive of, the thrill of peril. 
Self-inflicted gunshot wounds are emblematic. In Thompson v. 
Prudential Insurance Co. of America, the decedent learned to spin the 
chamber of a gun so its bullets never stopped in the firing position. s1 
After showing the results of one spin to a friend, he pulled the trigger 
without looking at the chamber himself, shooting himself to death. s2 
The Georgia court denied recovery.s3 By contrast, in New York Life 
48. 866 P.2d 774 (Cal. 1994) (describing and deploying a foreseeability standard while 
also using accidental-means analysis that is discussed infra in Part LB); id. at 819 (Mosk, J., 
dissenting) (discussing risks of cocaine use); see also Gordon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 260 
A.2d 338 (Md. 1970) (heroin fatality). 
49. Weil, 866 P.2d at 784. The court explained: "It is readily apparent that the risks 
attending the consumption of such substances are so great that death must be considered a 
common, natural or substantially likely consequence." Id. at 788. 
50. Id. passim (Mosk, J., dissenting). For Mosk's conclusions regarding illegality, see id. 
at 823 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (Although "[t]he majority do not squarely hold that the 
beneficiaries herein are barred from recovery because Weil's fatal act was illegal," they 
"strongly imply that the fact of its illegality weighs heavily against recovery, because they 
repeatedly incorporate that fact in their statement of the issues, in their discussion of the 
authorities, and in their conclusion."). An early critic agreed with Mosk, claiming that the 
outcome depended on illegality to the exclusion of foreseeability. Allison L. Hurst, 
Voluntary Ingestiun of a Known Hazardous and Illegal Substance Does Not Provide a Basis 
for Coverage Within the Terms of a Life Insurance Policy Affording Coverage for Death by 
Accidental Means, California Supreme Court Survey, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 851, 857 (1995) ("The 
majority based its conclusion on its cursory analysis that cocaine was a known hazardous and 
illegal substance and that its ingestion would naturally and probably result in death" and "it 
does not appear that the majority adequately evaluated the risk involved."). 
51. Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 66 S. E.2d 119, 123 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951). 
One witness explained how the decedent "could put one bullet in it and spin the cylinder 
around and make it hit on the bottom." Id. The decedent "did that five or six times that 
night and the bullet always landed on the bottom " so when he "pulled the trigger . . .  the 
bullet didn't fire." Id. 
52. As the witness recalled, "He . . .  handed me the gun to me (sic] and I took it in my 
hand and looked at it." Id. "I didn't think anything would happen." Id. "He put the pistol to 
his own head and pulled the trigger." Id. 
53. Id. at 123-24. The court in Thompson proceeded under an accidental-means 
framework, an approach to accident-insurance cases discussed infra Section LB. The case 
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Insurance Co. v. Harrington, the Ninth Circuit faced a decedent with 
gun expertise who shot himself in the head with a "very reliable" 
loaded gun which his experience indicated would not fire because it 
made a sound consistent with its safety being in place. s4 Finding that 
the decedent acted on "reasonable supposition" and that his death was 
"unexpected" "[a]s to him," the court granted recovery.ss The problem 
is that the Thompson decedent acted on a similarly reasonable 
supposition, making his death fairly improbable and unexpected. 
Other cases fit this pattern. Courts have allowed recovery for high­
risk recreational pastimes like leaping off dams or social activities like 
riding drunk and spread-eagle atop a car driven by an intoxicated 
compatriot.s6 Risks taken in demonstration of one's expertise within a 
socially acceptable pastime -like the gun hobbyist described above 
-have also counted. By contrast, courts have been unwilling to grant 
recovery to mere acts of bravura like russian roulette or lying down at 
night in traffic.s7 
Courts' tendencies to deny claims in these situations have solid 
provenances. Cases involving intentional third-party harms and 
suicides illustrate how criminal activity historically led to denials of 
recovery. While courts have long held wartime battlefield deaths 
accidental, barroom brawlers who picked the fight in which they died 
broke the law and often did not recover.ss Similarly, although suicides, 
became relevant to determining how high-risk acts of bravura alter the ways courts set the 
likelihood of harm necessary to preclude recovery when a Wisconsin appellate cour.: in 
Kennedy v. Washington National Insurance Co. explained the outcome in Thompson, by 
reasoning that death from russian roulette was "highly probable or likely." 401 N.W.2d 842, 
845 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). Distinguishing its autoerotic-asphyxiation decedent from the 
russian-roulette practitioner in Thompson, the court in Kennedy granted recovery. Id. at 846. 
54. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 299 F.2d 803, 804-805 & nl (9th Cir. 1962) ("[I]n 
order to make this sound with a loaded gun without its discharging, the safety would always 
have to be in the 'safe' position just as the sound was made and immediately thereafter."). 
55. Id. at 806. 
56. Critchlow III, supra note 25, 378 F.3d 246, 262 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that the 
accident-insurer defendant conceded that "'extreme-sport' activities" like "cliff rappelling, 
rock climbing, and sky-diving" "would not be excluded under the . . .  Policy" at issue); 
Knight v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 437 P.2d 417 (Ariz. 1968) (holding an experienced diver's 
death attempting to dive off the Coolidge Dam accidental); Ward v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
352 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) (finding an accident after an intoxicated man riding 
atop the vehicle his drunken friend drove fell to his death). 
57. See, e.g., Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 66 S.E.2d 119 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951) 
(russian roulette); Allred v. Prudential Ins. Co., 100 S.E.2d 226 (N.C. 1957) (lying down in 
traffic). 
58. See, e.g., Runge v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 1157, 1159 (4th Cir. 1976) (quoting 
Smith v. Combined Ins. Co., 120 S.E.2d 267, 269 (1961)) ("[W]here the insured culpably 
provokes the act which causes the injury and death, it is not death by accidental 
means . . . .  "); Russell S. Baldwin, Comment, Insurance - Accidental Means & Accidental 
Death 
- Harrell v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance: Tennessee's Emergence From the 
Serbonian Bog?, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 745, 756 (1997); cf Scales, supra note l, at 238. For an 
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which are traditiona ly il legal, have genera ly been uncovered by 
accident -insurance po licies, insane decedents who kil l themse lves are 
both less culpable and have been more likely to recover.59 The line of 
cases involving high-risk acts of bravura in which courts have been 
reluctant to grant recovery dates to the nineteenth century. In Pollock 
v. United States Mutual Accident Association, a Pennsylvania case, a 
proprietor offered to treat those in the store to poison.ro Although 
warned that the li quid was lethal, the decedent stil l be lieved the 
substance was harmless, "laughed[,] and ... drank the balance. " 61 He 
did not recover.62 
Many courts would be uncomfortable with the above analysis. Few 
courts have explicit ly discussed the role stigma should play in 
accidents, and those that have, have opposed recognizing a stigmatic 
aspect of accidents on the grounds that contract law is not normative 
and public policy should not app ly.63 These courts have noted that 
companies voluntarily issue policies covering a range of savory and 
unsavory activities. 64 Because insurers can choose what to include and 
exclude, they take on the precise contractual liability delineated in the 
po licy. 65 As a result, decedents and their claimants rely on the 
de lineated coverage.66 Moreover, hinging accident insurance recovery 
on norms affects few behaviors.67 The only victim in most accident-
early case granting recovery to a war victim, see State Life Insurance Co. v. Allison, 269 F. 93 
(5th Cir. 1920). 
59. Crandal v. Accident Ins. Co., 27 F. 40, 41, 44 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1886) (explaining its 
finding of accidentalness: "Crandal, took his own life by hanging, and . . .  at the time of the 
act of self-destruction he was insane." " [T]he act was no more attributable to his voluntary 
agency than if, as a sane man . . .  the same fatality, without co-operation on his part . . .  had 
overtaken him."). 
60. Pollock v. United States Mut. Accident Ass'n, 102 Pa. 230, 232 (1883). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 233. 
63. See, e.g. , Ward v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 352 S.W.2d 413, 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) 
("[O]ur question is a legal, not a moral or philosophical, one . . . .  "); Weil v. Fed. Kemper 
Life Assurance Co., 866 P.2d 774, 806 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("[D]isapproval is 
misplaced here."). 
64. See Weil, 866 P.2d at 806 (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("Nor was the company forced to 
issue the policy . . . .  "). 
65. See, e.g. , Todd I, supra note 7, No. 3:93CV0054-R, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21539, at 
*38 (1994), modified, 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Armed with the knowledge that such 
activity occurs, insurance companies cannot cry ignorance or morality in hopes of avoiding 
an ambiguous contract which apparently affords coverage."). 
66. See Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Nash, 97 So. 2d 4, 9 (Fla. 1957) (Drew, J., dissenting) 
(normative considerations do "violence to the reason for buying accident insurance"). 
67. The Bird v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. court explained, "The 
possibility that [recovery] will promote evil or . . .  depredations on the public because of the 
comforting reassurance that their beneficiaries will collect the insurance if they are killed in 
the commission of crime is remote, speculative and theoretical." 320 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1959); see also Weil, 866 P.2d at 823 (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("[N]o one, I submit, has 
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in surance ca se s  i s  the decedent, and the claimant s are generally 
innocent of whatever mi sconduct he undertook.68 
The problem with the se argument s i s  that by oppo sing the 
importation of stigmatic con sideration s into a contract they pre sume 
the contract doe s not contain them. A better approach i s  to a sk 
whether lay definition s of accident contain stigmatic a spect s. If so, the 
court would not in quire into the pre sence of stigma s becau se contract 
law serve s a normative function or becau se public policy would 
thereby be served, but strictly a s  relevant to clarifying the lay 
definition of accident. 
What evidence there i s  indicate s laypeople believe stigma s 
con stitute one a spect of a definition of accident, but have difficulty 
articulating what that a spect i s. In everyday speech, for in stance, it i s  
common and natural to speak of an accident' s victim, but awkward 
and incongruou s to sugge st that such a victim could al so be culpable or 
de spi sed. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary define s an accident 
a s  "an unexpected happening cau sing lo ss or in jury which i s  not due to 
any fault or mi sconduct on the part of the per son injured" or "an 
unfortunate event re sulting e sp[ecially] from carele ssne ss or 
ignorance" and without reference to blame.69 When court s have 
implicitly allowed moral judgment to color their deci sion s without 
explicitly explaining why, they too have indicated stigma' s ill-defined 
role. 
By only hindering recovery in ca se s  involving crime s and high-ri sk 
act s of bravura, court s choo se a heartland of normative tran sgre ssion s 
to which mo st laypeople will attach con siderable stigma s and 
tran sform it into the kind of bright-line rule court s can apply quickly 
and con si stently. There are good rea son s to believe that mo st people 
condemn crime s and high -ri sk act s of bravura. By cri minalizing 
activitie s, the state, on behalf of U .S. society a s  a whole, stigmatize s 
ever been 'encouraged' to engage in the recreational use of cocaine because he believes the 
beneficiaries of an insurance policy on his life will be paid more money if he accidentally 
overdoses and dies."); Scales, supra note 1, at 302 ("Explicitly stating the 'stupidity penalty' 
will likely keep few insureds off the thunderbolt."). 
68. See Weil, 866 P.2d at 805 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (in "the insurance context . . .  no one 
suffers physical harm but the actor"); Hurst, supra note 50, at 858 ("Unlike tort and criminal 
law, it is not the insured who benefits from illegal actions, but the innocent beneficiary."). 
69. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 37, at 7; see also THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 37, at 10-11 
(defining accident as "[a]n unexpected and undesirable event" and not as a blameless one); 1 
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at 74 (defining accident as "[a]nything 
that happens without foresight or expectation; an unusual event, which proceeds from some 
unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause; a casualty, a contingency" and not 
as requiring blamelessness); RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, 
supra note 37, at 12 (defining accident as both "an undesirable or unfortunate happening" 
and "Law. such a happening resulting in injury that is in no way the fault of the injured 
person for which compensation or indemnity is legally sought"). 
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and condemns them.70 It thus predefines the transgressions as 
outweighing their mitigating components. No such definitive 
condemnation reaches decedents who mi x high doses of prescription 
drugs with alcohol. High-risk acts of bravura represent stigmatized 
activities with no mitigating component. As one court reviewing 
denials of recovery in cases of russian roulette e xplained, such 
"bizarre " acts show "reckless abandon " and are "courting death. "71 
The implication is that the act is not only dangerous and widely 
stigmatized, but also has no redeeming traits. 
Moreover, it makes sense that courts do not further e xpand the 
range of stigma cases in which they hinder recovery. Although courts 
often talk about single, consensus lay definitions of words, a more 
realistic model recognizes that various laypeople define words 
differently. This diversity could be e xpansive in cases involving stigma 
because different individuals will attach stigmas to different activities, 
and in varied degrees. It would be untenable for courts to sort through 
this large, shifting, and comple x array of moral and social judgments 
case by case. 
It is now possible to evaluate the way courts have treated the 
stigma that attaches to acts of autoerotic asphy xiation. Many courts 
have raised it in dicta, comparing the practice to a crime or high -risk 
act of bravura. They have thereby analogized autoerotic-asphy xiation 
cases to the stigma cases in which they have hindered recovery. While 
such comparisons have some initial appeal, a more formal approach 
reveals that autoerotic asphy xiation is neither a crime nor a high-risk 
act of bravura, and conse quently should not face the less forgiving 
standards courts reserve for those cases. 
Courts deciding autoerotic-asphy xiation cases have usually 
observed or described the practice's stigmatized aspects. 72 The federal 
70. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571, 575-76 (2003) (describing how "the 
majority . . .  use[s] the power of the State to enforce [their] views on the whole society 
through operation of the criminal law," highlighting " [t]he stigma . . .  criminal statute[s] 
imposeO" and what "a criminal offense . . .  imports for the dignity of the person charged," 
and "underscor[ing] the consequential nature of the punishment and the state-sponsored 
condemnation attendant to the criminal prohibition"). 
71. Kennedy v. Wash. Nat'l Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). 
72. Compare infra notes 73-84 (including cases that raise stigma) and accompanying 
text, with supra notes 1 1 ,  24-25, and infra notes 1 18-119, 123-125 (listing all published 
autoerotic-asphyxiation accident-insurance cases besides International Underwriters, Inc. v. 
Home Insurance Co., 500 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Va. 1980)). In denying recovery, courts hint 
that they are considering factors other than likelihood of harm by describing the injury's 
foreseeability in terms of immediacy and tangibility as well as probability. See Cronin v. 
Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 29, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing "an imminent 
danger that consciousness will be Jost and death will result"); id. ("One who purposefully 
creates the conditions of risk foresees the logical consequence of risk, and has to assume that 
he may not be able to manage those conditions so as to eliminate the risk he has created."); 
Sigler I, supra note 28, 506 F. Supp. 542, 544 (S.D. Iowa 1981), affd, 663 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 
1981) ("[A] reasonable person would comprehend and foresee that placing a noose around 
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district co urt in Todd v. AIG Life Insurance Co. , for instance, opened 
its opinion with a disc ussion of the diffic ulties posed by the "prej udice, 
disg ust and c uriosity " with which most peop le view a utoerotic 
asphyxiation and frank ly acknow ledged that it fo und the practice 
unsett ling. 73 These reactions, it exp lained , led to "inf lammatory 
rhetoric " and made it diffic ult to understand the preva lence or 
dangers of the practice.74 Less sympathetic co urts have unnecessari ly 
rehashed tawdry evidence of death-scene cross-dressing, pornography, 
and sex ua l  deviance ; more circ umspect ones have described the 
practice as un us ua l, bizarre, a menta l i llness, and foo lish, or have 
ca lled the res ults awry, unfort unate, and tragic. 75 
his neck and subsequently hanging himself with the noose for the purpose of inducing 
asphyxia could result in his death."). 
73. Todd I, supra note 7, No. 3:93CV0054-R, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21539 (N.D. Tex. 
1994), at *l,  modified, 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir. 1995) ("prejudice, disgust and curiosity"); id. at 
*38 ("It is very difficult to understand or appreciate how any individual could put themselves 
at great risk to engage in autoerotic acts."). 
74. Id. at *l, *20-*21 & n.23. The court elaborated: "The greatest barrier to any real 
body of knowledge on the subject is the stigma which accompanies such a death." Id. at *20. 
Because "people were ashamed . . .  of the connotations of sexual abnormality," "most 
relatives 'preferred not to have [their relative's death] known to be an autoerotic death"' 
and "'[m]any went to lengths to disguise any telltale signs,' so as to prevent detection." Id. at 
*21 (quoting Dr. William Enos, former medical examiner for the state of Virginia, quoted in 
Seigenthaler, supra note 7, at 7). Thus, "in many cases, the researchers believe, these deaths 
are mislabeled suicide, sometimes after horrified parents have removed all evidence of the 
sexual nature of their child's death." Id. at *21 n.23 (quoting Jane E. Brody, Autoerotic 
Death of Youths Causes Widening Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1984, at Cl). 
75. See Runge v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 1157, 1 158 (4th Cir. 1976) (quoting the 
trial court) (describing autoerotic asphyxiation as "unusual" and "very bizarre"); MAMSI 
III, supra note 1 1 ,  825 A.2d 995, 996 (Md. 2003) (describing same "as a mental disorder 
falling into the category of 'Sexual Masochism"'); Parker v. Danaher Corp., 851 F. Supp. 
1287, 1295 (W.D. Ark. 1994) (quoting Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199, 
202 (Tex. App. 1981)) (describing same as "foolish"); Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Gilberts, 181 
F.3d 931, 932 (8th Cir. 1999) (footnote omitted) (finding "autoerotic asphyxia gone awry"); 
Todd II, supra note 11, 47 F.3d 1448, 1450 (5th Cir. 1995) (seeing an "unfortunate death"); 
Critchlow II, supra note 9, 340 F.3d 130, 131 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[A] postmortem photograph 
taken by the police [is] a tragic depiction that speaks for itself."), vacated and rev'd, 378 F.3d 
246 (2d Cir. 2004); Bennett v. Am. Int'I Life Assurance Co., 956 F. Supp. 201, 203 (N.D.N.Y. 
1997) (cross-dressing); Parker, 851 F. Supp. at 1289 (same); Tommie, 619 S.W.2d at 201 
(same); Kennedy v. Wash. Nat'! Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 842, 844 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) 
(pornography); Fawcett v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. C-3-97-540, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10061, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 28, 2000) (same); MAMSI Ill, supra note 11,  825 A.2d 995, 997 
(same); Hamilton v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 182 F. Supp. 2d 39, 41-42 (D.D.C. 2002) (bondage 
paraphernalia); Lonergan v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., No. CV-96-1 1832-PBS, 1997 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 24075, at *5 (D. Mass. May 29, 1997) (noting that investigators "also discovered 
in Mr. Lonergan's house forty-three video tapes involving sadomasochism and other items 
associated with sadomasochistic practices"); cf Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1 121, 
1 124 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that decedent's wife "told officers that she knew of her 
husband's sexual devices but thought he had quit using them"); Cronin v. Zurich Am. Ins. 
Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 29, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing how the police found a decedent 
"hanging naked in a sitting position, his buttocks suspended approximately 10 centimeters 
above the floor").  
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In elucidating arguments denying recovery, courts have 
rhetorically linked autoerotic asphyxiation to images of criminality 
and violent bravura.76 Some have overtly connected crime and 
autoerotic as phyxiation by arguing that the decedent 's temporary loss 
of oxygen was due to an intentional action and is thus similar to 
strangulation by an attacker. 77 In Runge v. Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co. , the Fourth Circuit drew an analogy between the autoerotic­
asphyxiation decedent before it and victims who provoke the attacks 
that kill them when it denied the former recovery under the standard 
courts use in cases involving the latter.78 
In the autoerotic-asphyxiation case of Kennedy v. Washington 
National Insurance Co. ,  a Wisconsin appellate court presented one 
form that an analogy between autoerotic as phyxiation and high-risk 
acts of bravura can take. 79 Discussing russian roulette, it wrote, 
"reckless abandon and exposure to a known and obvious danger 
cannot be said to have been accidental " and therefore, "[o]ne 
engaging in such a bizarre act as Russian Roulette knows that he is 
courting death or severe injury, and will be held to have intended such 
obvious and well known results if he is killed or injured." 80 While the 
court ultimately granted recovery by distinguishing russian roulette 
and autoerotic as phyxiation,81 its reasonin 'g reveals why it raised the 
comparison and how a less sym pathetic court might use it to deny 
recovery. The words and phrases that the court used to describe the 
risky and irredeemable aspects of russian roulette - reckless 
abandon, danger, bizarre and courting death -can also be ap plied to 
autoerotic as phyxiation. One could use the analogy to characterize 
autoerotic as phyxiation as a large risk undertaken for its own sake, 
and thus deny recovery. 
76. For example, the court in MAMSI III focused on the violence and risk inherent in 
the practice when it described: 
a yellow 114" synthetic rope attached to the loop binding the hands with a quick release knot 
secured by a wooden clothes pin. This rope was attached to a pulley to the above-mentioned 
leather belt around the neck . . .  tension [was] applied to the neck loops and wrists. The legs 
were tied at the level of the malleoli [ankle bones] with four loops of 114" cotton rope tied 
between the legs, with transverse loops forming a Figure "8" knot . . . .  
MAMSI III, supra note 1 1 ,  825 A.2d at 997 n.1 (quoting The Report of the Post Mortem 
Examination, dated 1 1  October 2000) (final alteration and final omission in original). 
77. See Critchlow /, supra note 5, 198 F. Supp. 2d 318, 323 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) ("decedent 
intentionally constricted his windpipe"), aff d, 340 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated and rev'd, 
378 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004); Sims v. Monumental Gen. Ins. Co., 960 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 
1992) [hereinafter Sims II] ("If . . .  a robber had partially strangled [the decedent], we would 
have no trouble holding . . .  the robber . . .  criminally liable."). 
78. 537 F.2d 1 157, 1159 (4th Cir. 1976). 
79. 401 N.W.2d 842 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). 
80. Id. at 845. 
81. Id. 
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Courts ha ve implicitly reinforced and rehearsed arguments linking 
autoerotic asphyxiation to crimes and high-risk acts of bra vura 
through voyeuristic descriptions of unsa vory scenes of death. Some 
ha ve luridly detailed e vidence of trans vestitism, bondage or 
masochism paraphernalia, and pornographic materials at the scene of 
death.82 Others ha ve labeled the cause of death an intentional act of 
hanging and describe instruments used to temporarily restrict oxygen 
flow to the brain as weapons.83 This violent imagery and cataloging of 
unsa vory and marginal sexual accoutrements both links autoerotic 
asphyxiation to murder rhetorically and deprecates its benefits or 
importance for practitioners.84 
82. Speaking of cross-dressing in Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Tommie, the 
court noted that the decedent had "dressed himself in [his wife's] wig, bra, nightie and 
panties." 619 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. App. 1981); see also Bennett v. Am. Int'! Life Assurance 
Co., 956 F. Supp. 201, 203 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[The decedent] was clad in blue and brown 
pantyhose; . . .  [a] brown stocking covered his head . . . .  "); Parker v. Danaher Corp., 851 F. 
Supp. 1287, 1289 (W.D. Ark. 1994) (quoting a police department report) ("The deceased 
had what appeared to be two soft balls inserted up his shirt around the breast area indicating 
the appearance of female breast (sic) ." ("(sic)" in original)). The court in Lonergan v. 
Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co. observed that the decedent had forty-three video tapes 
involving sadomasochism and other items associated with sadomasochistic practices in his 
house. No. CV-96-11832-PBS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24075, at *5 (D. Mass. May 29, 1997); 
see also Todd II, supra note 11,  47 F.3d 1448, 1450 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[The decedent] was lying 
on his bed with a studded dog collar around his neck; the collar, in turn, was attached to two 
leather leashes . . . .  "); Hamilton v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 182 F. Supp. 2d 39, 41-42 (D.D.C. 
2002) (decedent had a "bondage collar around his neck . . .  [, was] naked, except for a pair of 
wool socks, and was kneeling in front of mirrors with a pair of combat boots in front of 
him"). In Kennedy v. Washington National Insurance Co. the court recalled that "[v]arious 
pictures of the lower portion of animals and nude males were displayed on a wall near the 
shower." 401 N.W.2d at 845; see also MAMSI Ill, supra note 11,  825 A.2d 995, 997 (Md. 
2003) (quoting The Report of the Post Mortem Examination, dated 11 October 2000) ("The 
wall opposite the body was covered 'with a large amount of centerfold pictures of naked 
females."'). 
83. In International Underwriters, Inc. v. Home Insurance Co. , the court described a 
"hangmen's noose." 662 F.2d 1084, 1085 (4th Cir. 1981); see also Fawcett v. Metro. Life Ins. 
Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10061, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 28, 2000) ("After making a noose 
from a towel and attaching it to a rope, he tied the other end of the rope to a closet rod and 
placed the towel around his neck . . . .  "); Runge v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 1157, 1158 
(4th Cir. 1976) (quoting the trial court) ("The decedent had tied the electrical extension cord 
[and] . . .  placed the noose formed . . .  around his neck . . . .  "); Bennett, 956 F. Supp. at 203 
("[A] plastic bag covered the [decedent's head], and a green tie was loosely looped around 
his head with a slip knot."). A decedent "hanging by his neck, suspended from a luggage 
strap looped to a hook on the bathroom door" appeared in Cronin v. Zurich American 
Insurance Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 29, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Sigler II, supra note 12, 663 
F.2d 49, 49 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981). 
84. In describing autoerotic-asphyxiation-death scenes in ways that stress images of 
criminality and depravity, courts have reflected both the secondary sources available on the 
topic and the images that death scene photographs would depict. The few hits that searches 
on ProQuest, J-Stor and WorldCat produce, for instance, either link autoerotic asphyxiation 
to criminal activity or sexual dysfunction. See, e.g. , Todd McCarthy, Ken Park, VARIETY, 
Sept. 9-15, 2002, at 33 (describing KEN PARK (Cinea/Kees Kasander 2002)) ("The picture 
begins with the title character blowing his brains out one sunny day at a park. Then 
there's . . .  the autoerotic asphyxiation freak who masturbates in loving close-up before 
stabbing his grandparents to death in their bed . . . .  "); Robert Harris, Major's School for 
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But autoeroti c asphyxiation is neither a crime nor an a ct of 
bravura, and courts' comparisons thereto thus fall short. Autoeroti c 
asphyxiation and criminal battery may both involve nooses, 
physiologi cal effe cts (su ch as the deprivation of oxygen), s cenes of 
death, and individuals who engage in other, related marginal a ctivities. 
But only criminal battery, and not autoeroti c asphyxiation, violates 
another person's bodily integrity against her will or is against the law. 85 
High-risk a cts of bravura like russian roulette also di ffer from 
autoeroti c asphyxiation. Courts disapprove of high-risk a cts of bravura 
be cause they weigh an elevated probability of harm against the cheap 
thrill of demonstrating one's risk toleran ce in front of others.86 By 
contrast, similarly risky a ctivities that combine so cial displays of risk 
toleran ce with other, more a cceptable a ctivities, su ch as re creation, 
so cializing, or a hobby, have provided a basis for re covery. Be cause 
autoeroti c asphyxiation is by definition performed alone, pra ctitioners 
do not undertake the con comitant risk for so cial display.87 Rather, the 
risk forms a component of a sexual pra cti ce common to a variety of 
cultures and histori cal moments. 88 
Scandal, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 1994, at 134 (describing the negative impact of autoerotic­
asphyxiation scandals, among others, on John Major's Conservative Party); Autoerotic 
Asphyxiation: Still a Mysterious Practice, MEDICAL POST, Feb. 18, 1992, at 40. Psychological 
publications often also characterize autoerotic asphyxiation as a form of sexual masochism 
or dysfunction. See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 6, § 302.83 
(describing autoerotic asphyxiation as a form of sexual masochism). More common appear 
to be articles in forensic journals. See Craig M. Cooley, Autoerotic Deaths: Historical 
Perspectives and Investigative Consideration, 2 J. BEHAV. PROFILING (2001) (reviewing 
numerous such sources), http://www.Jaw-forensic.com/autoerotic.htm; Andrew P. Jenkins, 
Ph.D., CHES, EMT, When Self-Pleasuring Becomes Self-Destruction: Autoerotic 
Asphyxiation Paraphilia, 3 lNT'L ELECTRONIC J. HEALTH EDUC. 208, 214-15 (2000), at 
http://www.aahperd.org/iejhe/archive/jenkins.pdf (same). Police photographs of autoerotic­
asphyxiation-death scenes further strengthen the link between such acts and criminality or 
depravity. See, e.g. , Andrew P. Jenkins, Ph.D., CHES, EMT, Autoerotic Asphyxia Paraphilia 
Presentation on Powerpoint (unpublished PowerPoint presentation), at http:// 
www.cwu.edu/-jenkinsa/AEA.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2003). 
85. For a more in-depth discussion, see infra Part II. 
86. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
87. See, e.g., Critchlow II, supra note 9, 340 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[The 
decedent] retired to his locked bedroom in his parents' empty house, disrobed completely 
and attached an intricate, home-made harness consisting of ropes, weights, and counter­
weights leading to a noose around his neck."), vacated and rev'd, 378 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004). 
88. The Todd I court presented a rare opinion discussing its roots and spread: "[T]he 
practice may date as far back as 1000 AD. with the Ancient Mayans" and "autoerotic 
activity is a relatively common practice among Eskimos and Far Eastern couples." Supra 
note 7, No. 3:93CV0054-R, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21539, at *22 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 1994), 
modified, 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir. 1995). Cummings et al. also summarize instances of 
autoerotic asphyxiation in various cultures: 
Inuit children have been known to play a sexual game where they strangle each other; it is 
also said to be a frequent sexual practice among Asians to grasp the partner's throat in a 
strangling manner. The practice has also been described in the Yaghans of South America, 
the Celts, and the Shoshone-Bannock Indians. 
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The Supreme Court has suggested the value of such individual 
sexual practices. In a series of cases culminating in Lawrence v. Texas, 
it has indicated that many forms of sexua l activity fal l within the 
fundamental right to privacy protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.89 Although the Court 
has not held that autoerotic activities fall within the scope of this 
fundamental right to privacy, they have indicated the importance of 
sexual expression to individuals' dignity, autonomy, and identity.90 
Supra note 8 (citations omitted). They also review its history in the West, observing that 
"English brothels reportedly experimented with the act of hanging as a cure for impotence in 
the 1600's," that "[i]n the late 1700's a Czechoslovakian musician . . .  often requested 
prostitutes to hang him, sometimes for up to five minutes," that "[r]eports of autoerotic 
fatalities began to appear in the medical literature around 1856," and that " [t]he Marquis de 
Sade described in great detail the act of sexual asphyxiation in the book 'Justine."' Id. 
89. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574, 562, 567 (2003) (protecting adult consensual 
sexual intimacy while explaining "that our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection 
to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, 
child rearing, and education" and that "[i]n our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the 
home," "the most private of places"); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) 
(upholding the right to choose by explaining "that for two decades . . .  people have 
organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and 
their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that 
contraception should fail."); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraceptives for 
unmarried couples); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraceptives for 
married couples). 
90. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (citing other relevant cases). In striJ.cing Texas's 
criminalization of same-sex sexual conduct, the Court quoted Planned Parenthood on the 
connection between certain sexual activities and self determination: 
These [are] matters[] involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in 
a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's 
own concept of existence of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 
Beliefs about these matters . . .  define the attributes of personhood . . . .  
Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851). The Court was somewhat unclear 
as to whether all sexual activity or only interpersonal sexual activity fell within the above 
reasoning. In some places it focused on the interrelationships and social identities produced 
by homosexual sexual activity by noting the role sexuality can play as "one element in a 
personal bond that is more enduring," id. at 567, that certain "sexual practices [are] common 
to a homosexual lifestyle," id. at 578, and that statutes condemning such activities "seek to 
control a personal relationship," id. at 558. But the Court also spoke to sexual activity more 
broadly, identifying, "the most private human conduct [as] sexual behavior." Id.; see also id. 
at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's reasoning appears to extend similar 
protections to masturbation); Gary D. Allison, Sanctioning Sodomy: The Supreme Court 
Liberates Gay Sex and Limits State Power to Vindicate the Moral Sentiments of the People, 39 
TULSA L. REV. 95, 148 (2003) ("It is . . .  quite predictable that bans on masturbation will 
soon fall."); Dana Neacsu, Tempest in a Teacup or the Mystique of Sexual Legal Discourse, 
38 GONZ. L. REV 601, 603 (2002) (claiming commentators have already shown that 
masturbation is a constitutionally protected activity). More frequently, the Court 
simultaneously referred to sexual behavior and interpersonal relations as "sexual intimacy," 
"consensual sexual intimacy," and "intimate sexual conduct." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564, 
566. In so doing, it suggested that both sexual activity and social relations drive self­
determination, and that when they intersect in a private setting like the home they fall within 
the "right to liberty under the Due Process Clause." Id. at 578; cf Arthur S. Leonard, 
Lawrence v. Texas and the New Law of Gay Rights, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 189, 208 (2004) 
(suggesting that masturbation may be encompassed by the majority's reasoning); Jami 
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Practitioners echo such sentiments, valuing the activity highly enough 
to undertake its associated risks. Thus, like a high-risk recreation 
activity, and unlike a mere act of bravura, practitioners of autoerotic 
asphyxiation do not expose themselves to risk merely for its own 
sake .91 Rather, they pursue a form of pleasure and identity with 
socially beneficial aspects. Analogy to bravura fails . Because 
autoerotic asphyxiation is neither a crime nor a high-risk act of 
bravura, and because death is not the expected result of the practice, 
courts should grant recovery in autoerotic-asphyxiation cases. 
B .  Accidental-Means Analysis Does Not Provide 
a Viable Alternative Analysis 
A minority of jurisdictions decide accident-insurance cases under 
an approach that differs from those proposed and discussed above : 
"accidental-means analysis. "92 This once-dominant approach 
distinguishes insurance policies covering "accidental deaths " and those 
covering "death by accidental means."93 Reasoning that "accidental " 
Weinstein & Tobyn DeMarco, Challenging Dissent: The Ontology and Logic of Lawrence v. 
Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 423, 437-440 & n.62 (2004) (same); Calvin Massey, The 
New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 965 (2004) 
(arguing that masturbation laws seem likely to fall, but acknowledging the possibility of an 
injury-to-actor argument). 
91. See supra note 5. But cf Bennett v. Am. Int'I Life Assurance Co., 956 F. Supp. 201, 
211 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[T]he pursuit of a practice bordering on a near fatal outcome is a 
significant part of the pleasure and gratification associated with the act." (quoting Miskin 
Aff. 'lI 4)). 
92. Compare Weil v. Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 866 P.2d 774, 781 (Cal. 1994) 
(citing 3 HARNETT & LESNICK, THE LAW OF LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE § 7.03(1), at 7-
24 to 7-29 (1992)) ("(A]s of 1992, 22 jurisdictions, including California, expressly recognized 
the distinction between 'accidental means' and 'accidental death . . . .  "') with Weil, 866 P.2d 
at 798 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (raising questions as to the majority's total without challenging 
its general thrust) and Scales, supra note 1, 262-63, 266 (claiming that foreseeability tests 
constitute the majority rule). 
93. Scales, supra note 1, at 234 (explaining that in accident-insurance policies, the 
phrasing: "'external, violent and accidental means[]' . . .  was practically universal by 1925, 
and (that] few cases are found during this period involving policies departing from this 
language" (quoting CORNELIUS, supra note 1, at ii)); id. at 262-63 (stating that accidental­
means analysis was widely, if unevenly, applied during the interwar period). Many 
jurisdictions combine foreseeability analysis and accidental-means analysis under the single 
heading of accidental means. See, e.g. , Fawcett v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. C-3-97-540, 2000 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10061, at *10 (S.D. Ohio June 28, 2000) (quoting Linden Motor Freight 
Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 40 N.J. 511,  515 (1963)) ("(C]ourts interpreting accidental means 
provisions have allowed recovery for conduct entirely voluntary and intentional 'if, in the act 
which precedes the injury, something unforeseen, unexpected or unusual occurs which 
produces the injury."'). For example, in defending its continued application of accidental­
means analysis, the California Supreme Court observed that "a number of California 
decisions have focused particularly upon whether the insured's voluntary act itself is such 
that its common, natural, or probable consequence would be to visit injury or death upon the 
insured." Weil, 866 P.2d at 779, 783 ("(T]he approach . . .  is to consider the probability of the 
result in deciding whether the voluntary action of the insured preceding the injury can 
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modifi es "m eans," th es e  co urts h av e  r eq uir ed th at th e accid ent al 
asp ect of a d eath also b e  its m eans. 94 By th en confl ating m eans and 
c aus e, th ey h av e  t urn ed th e in q uiry aw ay from wh eth er th e r es ult -
inj ury or d eath - w as accid ent al and tow ard wh eth er som e action 
prior to th e r es ult w as accid ent ally und ert ak en.95 To disting uish, co urts 
h av e  r eason ed th at mish aps or invol unt ary, unint ention al actions th at 
constitute 'accidental means."'). This Note addresses courts that purport to look to 
foreseeability supra Section I.A. 
94. See, e.g., Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 496 (1934) ("The 
stipulated payments are to be made only if the bodily injury, though unforeseen, is effected 
by means which are external and accidental."). The argument rests on the intuition that 
fidelity to contracts' language mandates the approach. Because some, but not all, accident­
insurance policies limit coverage to only injuries caused by accidental means, one can read 
the difference as a distinction for which the parties have contracted and to which courts 
should give effect. See, e.g., Weil, 866 P.2d at 779 ("A differentiation is made . . .  between the 
result to the insured and the means which is the operative cause in producing this result."). 
The argument, however, contains a flaw: different words need not have different 
meanings. As noted in the Introduction, courts generally insist that they give terms their lay 
meanings. Here, it seems unlikely that laypeople would distinguish between accidental 
means and accidental results. In Nash the court noted that the distinction between accidental 
means and results is sufficiently elusive that "even the most learned judge or lawyer, in 
attempting to understand and comprehend the niceties of the distinction, is left in a state of 
bewilderment and confusion." 97 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1957); see also, e.g., Bennett v. Am. Int'] 
Life Assurance Co., 956 F. Supp. 201, 206 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) ("The fine distinction between 
'accidental death' and 'death from accidental means' would certainly never occur to an 
ordinary policy holder." (quoting 10 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 41:31 (1982))). It is also a 
distinction few insureds would expect to find in an accident-insurance policy. See, e.g., 
Knight v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 437 P.2d 416, 420 ("One paying the premium for a policy 
which insures against 'death by accidental means' intends to provide benefits to his family or 
named beneficiary in the event he should suffer death caused by accident as opposed to 
death caused by other means, such as suicide, murder, disease or natural death."). 
The reasonableness of the insured's confusion is compounded by the fact that many 
potential insureds do not read their own, often long and complex policies, Roger C. 
Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 840 (1990), much less those of their competitors. Thomas Corcoran, a 
Principal at Towers Perrin, explains that few potential insureds read competing policies 
before making a decision. Interview with Thomas Corcoran, Principal, Towers Perrin, 
Centerville, Mass. (Aug. 27, 2003). 
Vindicating insured confusion also makes sense in this context because, as the drafters of 
accident-insurance policies, insurers have the ability to frame their contracts in clear, 
comprehensible terms. See Knight, 437 P.2d at 420 ("Insurance companies are the drafters of 
the policies they sell and if they want to exclude against reckless and foolhardy acts . . .  they 
have it in their power to make such exclusions."). 
95. The court in Ward v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., 352 S.W.2d 413, 420 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1961), illustrated the conflation of means and cause: "[I]t is necessary to bear in mind 
that 'means,' as used in policy provisions such as those under consideration, is equivalent to 
'cause . . . .  " In reasserting its fidelity to accidental-means jurisprudence, the California 
Supreme Court showed how this conflation deemphasizes results when it reasoned that such 
policies "preclude coverage for voluntary and intentional conduct that results in unintended 
death." Weil, 866 P.2d at 780; see also Gordon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 260 A.2d 338, 339 (Md. 
1970) ("[A] means is not made accidental . . .  merely because death results unexpectedly."). 
The distinction generally reframes the inquiry as a search for an accident that precedes 
injury. See, e.g., Olson v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1994) ("[T]here must be some element of unexpectedness in the preceding act or occurrence 
which leads to the injury or death."); cf Scales, supra note 1, at 234 ("[U]npleasant results 
stemming from nonaccidental means [a]re not covered."). 
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lead to unforeseen deaths and injuries - like stumbling while 
descending from a platform - qualify, but voluntary actions that tum 
out badly -like russian roulette -do not. 96 
This approach does not represent a viable alternative to the 
approach this Note advocates because the distinction proponents of 
accidental-means analysis have favored cannot be made. 97 Accidental­
means analysis has proven unworkable and has been inconsistently 
applied .98 In some cases courts have been unable to locate the line 
between means and results, and where courts have applied the test, 
they have produced obscurely argued and conflicting opinions. 99 
Future courts have received little principled precedent from which to 
reason. 100 
The distinction between an accidental result and cause is false. In a 
strict sense, most, if not all, accidents include nonaccidental causes. To 
96. The Laney v. Continental Insurance Co. court provided an example in its summary 
of Georgia law: "Where an unusual or unexpected result occurs, by reason of the doing of an 
intentional act, with no mischance, slip or mishap occurring in doing the act itself, the 
ensuing injury or death is not caused by accidental means." 757 F.2d 1190, 1191 (11th Cir. 
1985) (quoting Jackson v. Nat'! Life & Accident Ins. Co., 202 S.E.2d 711,  712 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1973)) (citations omitted). It also wrote that "for an injury to result from accidental means, it 
must be the unexpected result of an unforeseen or unexpected act which was involuntarily 
and unintentionally done." Id. (quoting Johnson v. Nat'! Life & Accident Ins. Co., 90 S.E.2d 
36, 37 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955)). Professor Scales describes this as a "distinction between when 
someone . . .  has done something incorrectly, which may seem accidental, and when 
something unpleasant has merely happened to the insured." Scales, supra note 1, at 208. 
While this standard for policies requiring "accidental means" tends to narrow coverage, 
courts that utilize it generally become lenient in the face of accident-insurance policies that 
do not specifically mandate such means. See, e.g. , Olson, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 899 (quoting 
Weil, 866 P.2d at 774) (citations omitted in original) (summarizing California jurisprudence 
to the effect that '"policies requiring only that there be proof of accidental death have been 
construed broadly, "such that the injury or death is likely to be covered unless the insured 
virtually intended his injury or death'""). For examples, see United States Mutual Accident 
Association v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100 (1889), where the insured stumbled while descending from 
a platform, and Thompson v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 66 S.E.2d 119 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1951), a russian-roulette case. 
97. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Nash, 97 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1957) (Drew, J., dissenting) (calling 
the distinction between accidental means and results "a distinction without a difference"). 
98. As Justice Cardozo wrote, accidental-means analysis "will plunge this branch of the 
law into a Serbonian Bog." Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 499 (1934) 
(Cardozo, J. ,  dissenting) ("The proposed distinction will not survive . . .  application . . . .  "). 
99. See Nash, 97 So. 2d at 8 (Drew, J., dissenting) ("This line of cases has created a 
morass of decisions which have become shrouded in a semantic and polemical maze . . . .  "); 
Gordon, 260 A.2d at 340 (affirming accidental-means analysis while admitting that 
" (p]erhaps in some cases there is no way to distinguish"). 
100. See Nash, 97 So. 2d at 8 (Drew, J., dissenting) (describing available precedents as 
"almost a wilderness of cases in which varying facts and situations have been applied to 
varying principles" (quoting McCullough v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 264 P. 65, 67 (Kan. 1928))). 
Nonetheless, some courts have claimed that continued application of the test indicates that 
history has proven the distinction's feasibility. See Gordon, 260 A.2d at 341 ("(T]he 
distinction between accidental means and accidental results has been recognized and 
applied."); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Hemenover, 67 P.2d 80, 82 (Colo. 1937) 
("Respectable authority thus appears on both sides of this question."). 
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the e xtent that a result is unforeseen and unintended, it must result 
from an activity not undertaken as desired. 101 Consider a patient who 
takes an antibiotic to which she subse quently discovers she is allergic. 
If the accident is not in the taking of the pill, it is as if the accident lies 
in the pill itself. This artificially inserts an alien, intervening cause.102 In 
any event, most would deem the allergic reaction an accident. 
The same point can be made by observing that while causes a nd 
results may differ as a general matter, it is meaningless to s peak of 
both accidental causes and accidental results. By definition, accidents 
are unintentional.103 In every case, events must go awry and injury 
must follow. Deciding how to characterize this stream of events -
whether to include the intermediate divergence into the prior action 
or the subse quent result -is mere framing. 
A few e xam ples will illustrate. In Linden Motor Freight Co. v. 
Travelers Insurance Co. ,  the decedent avoided a collision with another 
fire truck by jerking the steering wheel, thereby causing a strain that 
killed him almost immediately. 104 The New Jersey court described t his 
as a "s pontaneous reaction," im plicitly involuntary and thus 
covered. 105 But one might also say that the decedent a p peared to drive 
as intended, and was in fact able to quite agilely avoid an accident. By 
framing it this way, the near accident becomes the une xpected result 
of the voluntary act of driving and the jerk and resultant death merely 
e xtensions thereof. 
This problem eve n a p pears in the doctrine's foundational cases. 
The Su preme Court first promoted accidental-means analysis in 
United States Mutual Accident Association v. Barry, a nineteenth ­
century case involvi ng a man who jum ped from a platform to t he 
ground and subse quently discovered he had injured himself. 106 The 
court presumed the decedent intended to land safely and thus viewed 
his injury as evidence of a misha p. 107 One is left to wonder whether the 
man's stumble was not the une xpected result of his voluntary and 
misha p-free decision to jum p off the platform. Not only was t his 
question not taken u p  in the Su preme Court's ne xt major case on the 
subject - Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. -but the 
101. See Landress, 291 U.S. at 501 (1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) ("The process of 
causation was unbroken from exposure up to death."); id. (Cardozo, J., dissenting) ("There 
was an accident throughout, or there was no accident at all."). 
102. See id. at 501 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) ("If there was no accident in the means, 
there was none in the result, for the two were inseparable."). 
103. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. But see Scales, supra note 1, at 208 
("[T]he logical space between 'means' and 'results' may be reasonably clear . . . .  "). 
104. Linden Motor Freight Co., 193 A.2d 217, 230 (N.J. 1963). 
105. Id. 
106. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 121 (1889). 
107. Id. 
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court also cited the Barry decision as a model in reaffirmin g 
accidental-means anal ysis.108 
In a series of cases, courts appl yin g accidental-means anal ysis have 
come to opposite conclusions on similar facts. Each collapses into 
framin g questions. Consider gunshot wounds. In Oldring v. 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. , the decedent incorrectl y believed that 
he had emptied his gun of its shells, pointe d it at his head and pulled 
the tri gger.109 Later investi gations revealed that a sin gle shell had stuck 
in the gun 's chamber.110 Observin g that the decedent was 
knowled geable about guns and did not anticipate the possibilit y of a 
shell remainin g in the chamber, the court found the means 
accidental.111 B y  contrast, recall Thompson v. Prudential Insurance Co. 
of A merica, a case involvin g a man who lea rned to spin a gun 's 
chamber so the bullet lod ged inside never stopped in the firin g 
position, and then shot himself to death after one bad spin.112 The 
court held that the means were not accidental, reasonin g that spinnin g 
the chamber and pullin g the tri gger were voluntar y actions and that 
onl y the bullet 's resultant position in the firin g position was 
accidental.113 The distinction depends on how the court framed the 
causal chain of events. In Oldring, one could ar gue that the decedent 
voluntaril y closed the chamber, pointed the gun at hi mself, and pulled 
the tri gger. Those actions occurred without mishap; onl y the 
subse quent result was unexpected. A more s ympathetic Thompson 
court mi ght have reasoned that the decedent attempted to spin the 
chamber of his gun to cause the bullet to land in a certain position. 
Because of a mishap, the spin did not go as usual, providin g the means 
for the subse quent result. 
Fatal overdoses provide another illustration. Weil v. Federal 
Kemper Life Assurance Co. involved a cocaine death.114 Reasonin g 
108. Landress, 291 U.S. 491, 497 (1934) (summarizing Barry, 131 U.S. 100 (1889)) 
("There was evidence . . .  that the insured alighted in a manner not intended, causing a jar or 
shock of unexpected severity."). Note both that this analysis no longer controls in the federal 
context, see supra note 32 and accompanying text, and that many insurance cases arise under 
state rather than federal law, cf note 30 (discussing ERISA's effect on expanding federal 
jurisdiction over insurance cases). 
109. Oldring, 492 F. Supp. 994, 996 (D.N.J. 1980). 
1 10. Id. 
111 .  The court mentioned that the decedent "was both knowledgeable about [the use of 
guns] and accustomed to handling them," and "had qualified as a sharpshooter." Id. As a 
result "the decedent's failure to completely empty the weapon of shells before 'playing' with 
it, i.e., the presence of a shell which was stuck in the gun's chamber, was an unexpected 
occurrence" and thus accidental. Id. at 998. 
1 12. Thompson, 66 S.E.2d 1 19 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951); see also supra notes 51-55 and 
accompanying text (discussing the case further). 
1 13. Thompson, 66 S.E.2d at 124 ("The most that can be said . . .  is that he hoped the 
cartridge would not stop in the firing position when his turn to pull the trigger came."). 
114. Weil, 866 P.2d 774, 777 (Cal. 1994). 
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bo th tha t the deceden t volun ta rily unde rtook to use cocaine and 
assume i ts associa ted risks, and tha t the re was no "sli p, misha p, o r  
mischance " p rio r to the resul t, the Califo rnia Su p reme Cou rt held tha t  
the means we re no t acciden tal.115 Com pa re Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co. v. Main, howeve r, whe re the Fif th Ci rcui t reasoned tha t 
because a deceden t had no t in ten tionally and volun ta rily se t ou t to kill 
himself, his fa tal ove rdose of p resc ri p tion d rugs and alcohol 
cons ti tu ted acciden tal means.116 The diffe ren t ou tcomes we re possible 
because the cou rt could posi tion the doses ' le thali ty ei the r as causes -
" took mo re than he wan ted " -o r  as resul ts - "didn' t ex pec t i t  would 
kill him. "117 
Unsu rp risingly, simila r p roblems have a risen in au toe ro tic­
as phyxia tion cases. Cou rts using acciden tal-means analysis have so fa r 
denied recove ry, reasoning tha t  the deceden ts in ten tionally and 
volun ta rily engaged in the ac tivi ty -s trangula tion - tha t  killed them 
and, as a resul t, assumed the concomi tan t risks.118 Bu t they could jus t 
as easily have loca ted the risks in the resul ts and desc ribed the key 
ac tion as failing to reins ta te oxygen flow to the b rain ra the r  than 
ini tially cu tting i t  off. Wi thin this al terna te f raming, deceden ts who 
failed to release the p ressu re on thei r necks befo re colla pse o r  
cons truc ted mechanical-safe ty sys tems tha t malfunc tioned, would have 
suffe red misha ps whose subse quen t resul ts we re dea ths.119 
1 15. Id. at 784. Arguing along similar lines, the court in Laney v. Continental Insurance 
Co. noted that its decedent "intentionally and voluntarily drank the alcohol that caused his 
death" and that no "mischance, slip or mishap occurred during his consumption of the 
whiskey and beer [that killed him by overdose] to cause him to consume more than he 
intended." Laney, 757 F.2d 1190, 1192 (11th Cir. 1985). Deploying accidental-means 
language, it concluded, "Although the result of his drinking [death] was unexpected, the act 
of drinking was intentional." Id.; see also Gordon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 260 A.2d 338, 340 
(Md. 1970) ("[W]ith the use of [the] illegal drug [heroin] without medical authorization or 
supervision, a drug with well known potential for injury, we are hard pressed to say that a 
great amount of risk was not assumed, or was unforeseeable."). 
1 16. Main, 383 F.2d 952, 960 (5th Cir. 1967) ("Main did not intend to take four times as 
many Medomin tablets as Dr. Crouch had prescribed" and "[a]t the time he took such 
additional tablets, his judgment, his memory, and his awareness of the lapse of time were all 
impaired by the alcohol he had drunk [that] evening."). 
1 17. Cf Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co., 7 N.E.2d 18, 20 (N.Y. 1937) ("He took too 
much veronal; it was a mistake, a misstep, an unexpected effect from the use of his 
prescribed medicine."). 
1 18. See MAMSI //I, supra note 11, 825 A.2d 995, 999 (Md. 2003) (Because "the insured 
intended to cut off his air supply" and "[t]he cutting off of the air supply caused his death," 
"[h]e intended the act that resulted in his death." (quoting MAMSI Life & Health Ins. Co. v. 
Callaway, Circuit Court for Wicomico County, No. 22-C-00-001273 (2001), vacated, MAMSI 
//, supra note 11 ,  806 A.2d 274 (Md. Ct. App. 2002), vacated, MAMSI Ill, supra note 1 1, 825 
A.2d 995 (Md. 2003))); Runge v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 1 157, 1 159 (4th Cir. 1976) 
("Runge, Jr., did not die as a result of 'accidental means.' . . .  Death, under these 
circumstances, was a natural and foreseeable, though unintended, consequence of Runge's 
activity."). 
1 19. For an example of a failure to release pressure see Connecticut General Life 
Insurance Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), explaining that " [t]he 
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Because accidental-means analysis cannot provide determinate 
grounds for determining accidentalness, it does not represent a viable 
alternative to the approach delineated in Section I.A. Courts ought to 
hold autoerotic -asphyxiation deaths accidental. 
I I. T HE E FFECT OF I NTENTIONALLY S ELF- I NFLICTED I NJURY 
E XCLUSION C LAUSES 
Part I claims autoerotic-asphyxiation deaths are accidents within 
the meaning of accident-insurance policies. This Part turns to 
exclusion clauses. " Virtually all accident policies exclude deaths 
resulting from 'intentionally self-in flicted injury,"' which are the only 
exclusion clauses courts have used t o  deny recovery in cases of 
autoerotic asphyxiation.U0 This Part argues that these exclusion 
clauses should not apply to autoerotic-asphyxiation deaths. 
Exclusion clauses differentiate instances where insureds 
intentionally injure themselves but then unintentionally incur a further 
harm from other types of accidents. The Ohio federal district court in 
Fawcett v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. related a lucid example : 
An insured might so wish to avoid continuing on his job that he plans to 
shoot himself in the foot, thus intending to render himself unable to 
work, but yet alive . . . .  However, upon successfully shooting himself in 
the foot, the injured loses consciousness due to the extreme pain and the 
gruesome sight of his damaged appendage. Unfortunately, no one hears 
the shot, and no one returns home to the home to discover the insured 
until many hours have passed, during which time the insured has bled to 
death . . . .  [T]he insured may not have committed suicide, but his death 
exercise rope was equipped with pulleys so that with his left foot he could increase or 
decrease the pressure of the rope around his neck." See also Int'! Underwriters, Inc. v. Home 
Ins. Co., 662 F.2d 1084, 1085 (4th Cir. 1981) (describing a failed "pulley system . . .  
designed . . .  to protect [the decedent] from asphyxiation if he lost consciousness"). 
120. Scales, supra note 1,  at 294. While the language of these clauses may vary, it has 
rarely affected courts' reasoning. Compare, e.g., Tommie, 619 S.W.2d at 201 ("The policy 
specifically excludes from coverage any loss which results directly or indirectly from ' . . .  
suicide or intentionally self-inflicted injury,' . . . .  " (first alteration in original)), with Sigler I, 
supra note 28, 506 F. Supp. 542, 543-44 (S.D. Iowa 1981), affd, 663 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1981) 
("RISKS NOT ASSUMED: . . .  (f) intentionally, self-inflicted injury of any kind, while sane 
or insane."). For a case where the language did control, see American Bankers Insurance Co. 
v. Gilberts, 181 F.3d 931, 933 (8th Cir. 1999), explaining that under a "bodily injury" 
exclusion clause "we cannot say . . .  that a reasonable insured would find that a temporary 
decrease in the oxygen level in the brain, of itself, is a bodily injury in the ordinary sense of 
the term." See also Sims II, supra note 77, 960 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1992) (The "policy 
excludes 'any loss resulting directly or indirectly, wholly or partly from"' intentionally self­
inflicted injury and "[h]is death 'resulted directly or indirectly, wholly or partly from' that 
intentionally self-inflicted injury."). 
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was certainly caused "wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, by . . . [an] 
intentionally self-inflicted injury . . . . "121 
While this exclusion can, as in the case of autoerotic asphyxiation, 
raise difficult questions concerning the definition of an injury and the 
necessary link bet ween cause and effect to trigger the policy, no 
danger exists that every accidental result will be traced to an 
intentionally self-in flicted injury.122 
To date, courts have split over the applicability of these exclusion 
clauses in cases of autoerotic-asphyxiation deaths. These 
disagreements center on whether aspects of nonfatal autoerotic 
asphyxia -that is, partial strangulation -cause injury and, to a lesser 
extent, the relationship bet ween an injury and death necessary to 
trigger the clause. Many courts have held that "the death was barred 
from recovery because of a clause in the insured's policy excluding 
coverage f rom 'intentionally, self-inflicted injury of any kind.'"123 
Others have reached the opposite conclusion. 124 Still others have 
upheld insurer determinations denying compensation under specific 
policy language triggering deferential arbitrary-and-capricious 
standards of revie w of insurer determinations.125 
121. Fawcett, No. C-3-97-540, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10061, at *18-19 (S.D. Ohio June 
28, 2000} (quoting Shepherd v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22203, at *14 
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 1995)). 
122. For example, when someone crashes his car accidentally the cause may be 
distraction or poor skills, but it is not the intentional self-infliction of a prior injury. 
Not all commentators find this approach convincing. See Scales, supra note 1, at 294. To 
the extent that this analysis is not convincing and one believes no intentionally self-inflicted 
injury can be accidental, this Part's analysis would become moot and its conclusion that 
recovery should be granted in cases of autoerotic-asphyxiation deaths would automatically 
follow. But see Parker v. Danaher Corp., 851 F. Supp. 1287, 1295 (W.D. Ark. 1994) 
(concluding an autoerotic-asphyxiation death "constituted an accident," but "hasten(ing] to 
say that we are not faced in this case with an exclusionary clause for injury resulting . . .  from 
an intentionally self-inflicted injury"). 
123. Sigler II, supra note 12, 663 F.2d 49, 49 (8th Cir. 1981) (quoting Sigler I, supra note 
28, 506 F. Supp. 542, 545 (S.D. Iowa 1981), aff d, 663 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1981}); see also 
Critchlow II, supra note 9, 340 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated and rev'd, 378 F.3d 246 (2d 
Cir. 2004}; Sims II, supra note 77, 960 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1992); Cronin v. Zurich Am. Ins. 
Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 29 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Lonergan v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., No. CA-96-
11832-PBS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24075 (D.Mass. May 29, 1997); MAMSI III, supra note 
11, 825 A.2d 995 (Md. 2003). 
124. Critchlow III, supra note 25, 378 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004}; Travis v. Veterans Life 
Ins. Co., 60 Fed. Appx. 707 (9th Cir. 2003); Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121 (9th 
Cir. 2002}; Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Gilberts, 181 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 1999}; Conn. Gen. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981). 
125. Hamilton v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 182 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.D.C 2002); Fawcett, 2000 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 10061 (S.D. Ohio 2000). These arguments proceed by taking the short leap 
from observing that defining injury is difficult to concluding that no definition would be 
arbitrary and capricious. The problem is that difficult and rational do not so easily map. As 
this Part argues, although determining whether autoerotic-asphyxiation deaths trigger 
intentionally self-inflicted-injury exclusions can be difficult, the only rational outcome is to 
allow recovery. To decide otherwise without further justification would indeed be arbitrary 
and capricious. 
2202 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:2172 
In determining whether partial strangulation causes an injury that 
precedes and results in death, one must categorize the physical effects 
that accompany successf ul incidents of autoerotic asphyxiation.126 
Many courts have portrayed them as aberrant, arguing that the body 's 
and brain 's compositions and functions are altered for the worse, and 
concluding that partial strangulation injures. This Part disagrees by 
exposing such argumen ts' rhetorical underpinnings and explaining that 
the harms they purport to identify are better characterized as 
differences. Because successful autoerotic asphyxiation involves no 
permanent harms, no physical injuries, and no loss of autonomy, this 
Part concludes it neither constitutes an injury nor triggers the 
exclusion. 
The changes in the blood's composition and tissue damage that 
accompany successful acts of autoerotic asphyxiation are one 
candidate for an injury that results from the practice.127 To the credit 
of proexclusion courts, few have seriously made this argument. 
Temporary and unnoticed alterations in blood composition hardly 
appear to constitute an injury and, as one court explained, "[t]he loss 
of a few cells could easily be so minimal that it would not rise to the 
level of a bodily injury as the average insured would understand the 
term."128 To hold otherwise would be to characterize the impact and 
holding of breath that accompany diving into a swimming pool as 
injuries. 
The stronger and more popular pro-injury argument focuses on the 
alterations in brain functionality that accompany partial strangulation. 
The argument observes "a reduction of the supply of oxygen to the 
brain in order to produce a state of hypercapnia [or increased carbon 
dioxide in the blood]. "129 This hypercapnia produces "physiological 
126. Because decedents do not attempt to commit suicide, the death cannot constitute 
the intentional injury. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text. 
While this Note argues that autoerotic asphyxiation causes no physical changes that both 
constitute injuries and result in death, one can identify certain injuries that play no causal 
role in death that sometimes accompany autoerotic asphyxiation. Bruising is an example. 
When bruising occurs in a lethal episode of autoerotic asphyxiation, an intentionally self­
inflicted injury precedes death. But these events do not trigger the exclusion. Because no 
causal connection exists between the bruise and the death, the death does not result from the 
bruise. See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text. Because such injuries cannot trigger 
the clause, this Note limits its focus infra to physical changes that result from oxygen 
deprivation, for this is the aspect of autoerotic asphyxiation that can both cause death and 
impede practitioners' ability to interrupt the lethal process once underway. 
127. See, e.g., Sims II, supra note 77, 960 F.2d at 480 ("[T]he type of strangulation 
desired by Mr. Brumfield damages tissues in the neck . . . .  "); Cronin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 38 
(Asphyxia "result[s] in hypoxia (decreased oxygen in the blood) and hypercapnia (increased 
carbon dioxide in the blood)."). 
128. Gilberts, 181 F.3d at 933. 
129. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d at 203. 
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effect[s ],"130 including reduced brain activity, "loss of coordination and 
self-control," impairment of "the higher cerebral functions of thought, 
consciousness and awareness," " 'lightheadedness, ... and the inability 
to appreciate the hazard of the situation. "'131 These effects are 
"abnormal" 132 and, as framed, appear to be both "clearly harmful" 133 
and "a 'hurt' to [practitioners'] physical and mental being."134 This 
" 'hurt' or 'harm' is an injury" 135 and so "an injury within the meani ng 
of the exclusion occurred." 136 The argument works in part by 
conflating harmless effects like lightheadedness with more serious 
ones l ike reduced brain activity into a generic laundry l ist of symptoms 
that add up to an injury.137 But it also works by identifying a series of 
significant alterations to brain function. 
To see the weaknesses in the above argument, first note that it 
transforms neutral effects into symptoms by using large words to 
medicalize unremarkable changes.138 One could just as easily shift the 
paradigm to one of difference and observe that asphyxia has some 
pleasurable aspects and produces some changes in brain function.139 
Because some altered mental states are for the better, and most 
cannot be characterized with a single broad stroke, the question 
becomes whether the loss of brain function that accompanies asphyxia 
130. Critchlow I!, supra note 9, 340 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated and rev'd, 378 
F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004). 
131. Cronin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (quoting Reay Aff. '11 5). 
132. Id. at 40. 
133. Sims v. Monumental Gen. Life Ins. Co., 778 F. Supp. 325, 328 (E.D. La. 1991), 
aff d, 960 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Sims I]. 
134. Cronin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 40. 
135. Id. 
136. Critchlow I!, supra note 9, 340 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated and rev'd, 378 
F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004). 
137. See Critchlow Ill, supra note 25, 378 F.3d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing expert 
opinions analogizing Jightheadedness to changes in body temperature and blood pressure 
that do not form injuries). 
138. Courts advocating recovery disrupt this process by pointing out its perverse results 
and giving medical vocabulary mundane definitions. See, e.g., Critchlow II, supra note 9, 340 
F.3d at 138 ("Under that formulation, many activities and exercises would constitute 'injury' 
such as to relieve the insurer of the obligation to pay for far less exotic accidents."); Todd II, 
supra note 11,  47 F.3d 1448, 1453 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[A]sphyxia, a word denoting a shortage of 
oxygen reaching the brain or other bodily tissue."). 
139. Following this line, one court suggested asphyxia is harmless and enjoyable because 
"a state of hypercapnia simply alters the amount of oxygen in the brain, thus heightening or 
intensifying certain body sensations." Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1981); see also Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121, 1 129 (9th Cir. 
2002) (Autoerotic asphyxia causes "temporary deprivation of oxygen, a euphoric light­
headedness . . .  , and an intensified sexual experience."). Another noted no evidence "that 
the procedure involves pain of any kind." Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Gilberts, 181 F.3d 931, 
933 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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con stitute s an injury. 140 It s effect s are short-lived, so the lo ss of brain 
function is a temporary side effect of a plea surable experience. The 
experience can thu s be analogized to u se of sleeping pill s or "a 
swimmer hold ing hi s or her breath wh ile under water. "141 Mo st 
laypeople would identi fy ne ither ca se a s  illu strating an intentionally 
self-infl icted injury to one self, and ab sent someone specifically 
framing the problem in term s of lo ss of brain activ ity, mo st would not 
def ine such temporary effect s a s  injurie s. 142 
Thi s analogical rea son ing ha s sat unea sily with some court s. A s  
one put it : "Any def init ion of 'injury' that exc lude s strangulat ion -
whether fatal or not - i s  simply unrea sonable. "143 Rather than 
cl inically de scr ibing a sphyxiation 's effect s on the brain, the se court s 
have focu sed on the intuition that strangulation con stitute s "a wrong 
to the integrity of [one' s] own body. "144 A number have buttre ssed and 
elucidated thi s claim by analogizing autoerotic a sphyxiation to battery: 
"If . . .  a robber had partially strangled him, we would have no trouble 
holding that Mr. Brumfield had been in jured and that the robber 
140. It is worth noting that in its strong form, the above argument is fragile. As one 
court points out, "That decedent had engaged in this very activity on prior occasions without 
apparently serious or permanent adverse consequences does not mean that the activity did 
not injure him . . . .  " Critchlow II, supra note 9, 340 F.3d at 132-33. And to the extent that the 
argument depends on the absence of pain or the actual lack of any permanent damage at all, 
insurance companies could counter with evidence that placing sufficient pressure on one's 
neck to cut the flow of oxygen to one's brain is often both painful and a cause of minor tissue 
damage. These rebuttals, however, do little to counter the weaker intuition of the argument: 
the decedent intentionally engaged in asphyxia because he thought he would enjoy it and, 
· most likely, did not think it would harm him. In this sense, the decedent might analogize his 
change in mental state to anti-depressants by claiming both are for the better. 
141. MAMSI 111, supra note 11 ,  825 A.2d 995, 1007 (Md. 2003) (summarizing MAMSI 
ll, supra note 11 ,  806 A.2d 274 (Md. App. 2002), vacated, MAMSJ Ill, supra note 11, 825 
A.2d 995 (Md. 2003). For a discussion of the rapidity and completeness of the return to 
normalcy following successful incidents of autoerotic asphyxiation, see Padfield: "(The 
decedent's] oxygen level would then have been restored (had he survived] . . .  and he would 
have returned home uninjured." Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1129; see also Critchlow II, supra note 
9, 340 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003), (Kearse, J., dissenting) (Asphyxia has "no serious or lasting 
adverse impact on one's health."), vacated and rev'd, 378 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004); Gilberts, 
181 F.3d at 933 ("There was essentially no evidence advanced for purposes of summary 
judgment . . .  that an individual's body is any different after the performance of partial 
asphyxia in this manner than it was before . . . .  "). 
142. Critchlow Ill, supra note 25, 378 F.3d at 262 (reasoning that the "nonserious, 
temporary changes in condition" that accompany partial strangulation "are not what persons 
of reasonable or average intelligence and experience would ordinarily understand to be 
meant by 'injuries"'). 
143. Critchlow I, supra note 5, 198 F. Supp. 2d 318, 327 (W.D.N.Y. 2002), atfd, 340 F.3d 
130 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated and rev'd, 378 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004). 
144. Cronin v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 29, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, at http://www.oed.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2002)) 
("A reasonably intelligent person would conclude that the 'purposely self-inflicted injury 
exclusion' applies to situations where the policyholder causes a wrong to the integrity of his 
own body to cause himself 'suffering or mischief willfully and unjustly inflicted."'). 
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should be held criminally liable." 145 Such analogies suggests a parallel 
bet ween an individual disrupting the flo w of oxygen to his o wn brain 
and a third party doing it, note that the latter is clearly injurious, and 
conclude that all partial strangulation interrupts the normal operation 
of one's body and thereby violates its integrity. 
Although the fact that courts have often described death scenes in 
autoerotic-asphyxiation cases with language evocative of homicide 
reports strengthens the metaphor bet ween fatal autoerotic 
asphyxiation and murder, the comparison also gives a way the game.146 
The problem with any argument focusing on the wrongs partial 
strangulation causes to the integrity of one's body is that it conflates 
the word's technical and popular definitions. While strangulation can 
describe depriving oneself oxygen, it generally pertains to violent, 
third-party batteries. The analogy works not by sho wing t wo examples 
of asphyxiation, but by attaching to autoerotic asphyxiation the violent 
loss of autonomy people associate with criminal or tortious batteries. 147 
An illustration may help. Imagine a series of situations where a 
person exercises varying degrees of control over her temporary 
deprivation of oxygen : holding one's breath under water, a child being 
dunked under water while horseplaying in a pool, and a would -be 
robber strangling his vict im into submission. It hardly seems like an 
injury or a violation of one's body's integrity to s wim a distance in a 
pool. While we might see a stronger case where one child dunks 
another, it still feels weak. But by the time we imagine a person facing 
a would-be robber who is strangling her into submission, the case for 
injury has become strong. 
To distinguish the under water swimmer and strangling robber, 
compare the mental states of the asphyxiated individuals. The 
s wimmer alters her body chemistry and function voluntarily. She 
expects to surface and return to normal and does not perceive herself 
as causing her body any harm. But the victim of a strangling robber 
does not voluntarily deprive herself of oxygen. She does not kno w 
whether she will survive and perceives the third party as causing her 
harm. The injury inheres in the loss of autonomy, the apparent danger, 
its potential permanence, the resultant psychological injury, and the 
actor's malignant intent. Understood this way, the analogy 
145. Sims II, supra note 77, 960 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Critchlow /, supra 
note 5, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 324-25; Sims I, supra note 133, 778 F. Supp. 325, 328 (E.D. La. 
1991), affd, 960 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1992); Sigler I, supra note 28, 506 F. Supp. 542, 545 (S.D. 
Iowa 1981), affd, 663 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1981). 
146. See, e.g., Bennett v. Am. Int'l Life Assurance Co., 956 F. Supp. 201, 203 (N.D.N.Y. 
1997) ("[A) plastic bag covered the [head), and a green tie was loosely looped around his 
head with a slip knot."). 
147. For further discussion of linguistic links between autoerotic asphyxiation and 
criminal activity as well as the links' analytic weakness, see supra notes 76-78, 82-85 and 
accompanying text. 
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underscores the absence of injury in successfu l acts of autoerotic 
asphyx ia .  
Where adopted, the "reasonab le-expectations doctrine " may 
mandate the sa me resu lt.148 Th is doctrine grew ou t of the traditiona l 
interpretat iona l canon tha t a mbiguous ter ms shou ld be construed 
aga inst their drafters.149 Rather than look so le ly to a contract's 
language, howe ver, the doctr ine asks whether the s ignator ies who d id 
not draf t the contract wou ld reasonab ly expect a poten tia l  resu lt.150 If 
not, the doc tr ine d isfa vors that outco me. 151 
When peop le who engage in autoerot ic asphyxia tion purchase 
acc iden t insurance they can reasonab ly expect that the pract ice wi ll be 
co vered. 152 Prac titioners experience au toerot ic asphyx ia tion as 
p leasurab le, intend to cause the mse lves no har m, and often do not 
cause any ha rm to the mse lves .153 A lthough cour ts appear capab le of 
co mbin ing the phys ica l and menta l  e fec ts of part ia l  strangu lation to 
create the i mpression of injury , autoerot ic-asphyx ia tion pract it ioners 
wou ld like ly disagree and f ind the extension of the c lause to the ir 
ac ti vit ies bo th unreasonab le and unfair.154 Moreo ver , most insureds do 
no t read the difficu lt-to-understand contracts of adhes ion tha t the ir 
po lic ies const itute , and ins tead depend on insurers ' good fa ith when 
they assent to whate ver part icu lar exc lusions app ly. 155 A lthough 
insurers are aware of the pract ice and cou ld eas ily insert a separate 
148. For a swnmary of jurisdictions accepting and rejecting the reasonable-expectations 
doctrine, see, for example, Henderson, supra note 94, at 823, 828, 834-35. 
149. This principle, known as contra proferentem, is embodied in § 206 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts: "In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a 
promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates 
against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981). 
150. For a clear and insightful review of the modem manifestations of the reasonable­
expectations doctrine, see Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Revisited, 5 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 107 (1998). Some courts that purport to adopt reasonable-expectations doctrine 
apply it identically to contra proferentem. Henderson, supra note 94, at 826. This Note 
excludes these jurisdictions from its discussion of reasonable-expectations doctrine because 
the purpose of this discussion is to elucidate the additional support the doctrine provides. 
151.  Rahdert, supra note 150. 
152 See supra note 94. 
153. See supra notes 5, 139, 141-142 and accompanying text. 
154. Difficulties in identifying autoerotic-asphyxiation prac!Ittoners make any 
statements about their opinions speculative. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
155. See, e.g. , Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n, 67 N.E.2d 248, 251 
(N.Y. 1946) (discussing difficulties in formulating a written definition of accident); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 comment b (1981) ("Customers do not in 
fact ordinarily understand or even read the standard terms. They trust to the good faith of 
the party using the form . . . .  "); cf Henderson, supra note 94, at 838 ("Insurance contracts 
are generally contracts of adhesion . . . .  "). 
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clause excluding autoerotic -as phyxiation deaths, they do not.156 As a 
result, various formulations of the still -develo ping reasonable ­
ex pectations doctrine could re quire courts in those jurisdictions that 
have ado pted it to negate the clause's a p plication to autoerotic ­
as phyxiation deaths.157 
Intentionally self-inflicted injury exclusions should not a p ply in 
cases of autoerotic-as phyxiation deaths. While in some cases 
decedents die as a result of the effects of as phyxia overwhelming the 
mental awareness, decisionmaking abilities, and motor skills they 
de pend on to survive, they do not intentionally inflict this or any other 
injury on themselves. Rather, practitioners of autoerotic as phyxiation 
tem porarily alter their mental state for pleasure. Des pite the 
associations with third- party strangulation that courts attach to self ­
induced as phyxia, it does not result in a loss of autonomy. The 
physical changes to one's mental state it causes parallel those most 
lay peo ple would label noninjurious.158 Claimants should recover. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has argued that courts facing the most common 
accident-insurance policies ought to grant recovery in cases of deaths 
arising from autoerotic as phyxiation. By a p proaching the problem 
formally, Part I demonstrated that autoerotic-as phyxiation deaths 
constitute accidents under viable a p proaches to the issue. Part I I  
turned to exclusions, observing that intentionally self-inflicted injury 
156. See E-mail from Thomas Corcoran, Principal, Towers Perrin to author (Jan. 3, 
2005, 03:51 PM EST) (on file with author). 
157. Because autoerotic-asphyxiation practitioners would likely find the application of 
these clauses to their practices unfair and unreasonable, they would run afoul of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which refuses to enforce any term that an insurer had 
"reason to believe [an insured] would not [assent to] if he knew that the writing contained 
[that) particular term." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981); see also 
Henderson, supra note 94, at 825 ("The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants 
and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even 
though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations." 
(quoting Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970))). To the extent that autoerotic-asphyxiation practitioners do 
not intend to kill themselves and hope to receive pleasure rather than injury from their 
activities, some courts would be "willing to ignore clear policy language" on grounds of 
'"situational unfairness,' where standard-form insurance policies result in unfair coverage 
restrictions when applied to a unique policyholder." David J. Seno, The Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law: What to Expect in Wisconsin, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 
859, 867-68 (2002); cf Rahdert, supra note 150, at 127 ("Most . . .  of the arguments advanced 
by . . . proponents of the doctrine . . . have focused principally on this aspect of the 
reasonable expectations idea."). 
158. To the extent that viable parallel alternative arguments exist, the interpretive 
canon of contra proferentem and its requirement that language susceptible to multiple 
meanings be resolved against the drafters of contracts (here insurers) mandates the same 
result. See supra note 149. 
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clauses are the most common relevant clauses and ex plaining that 
because autoerotic as phyxiation is not in jurious it does not trigger 
them. As a result, absent exce ptional and additional exclusions, 
claimants on the accident-insurance policies of autoerotic­
as phyxiation decedents should recover. 
